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ABSTRACT 
ANDREW DAVID BAXTER.  Tradeoffs in the use of value-added estimates of 
teacher effectiveness by school districts.  
(Under the direction of DR. JENNIFER L. TROYER) 
 
 A new capacity to track the inputs and outcomes of individual students’ education 
production function has spurred a growing number of school districts to attempt to 
measure the productivity of their teachers in terms of student outcomes.  The use of these 
value-added measures of teacher effectiveness is at the center of current education 
reform.  This study links the technical work of academic researchers with the 
implementation and policy considerations school districts are likely to face in 
incorporating value-added measures in their teacher evaluations.  First, I assess the 
choices the district must make in specifying one or more models.  Then, I evaluate three 
potential threats to the validity of the inferences from value-added data:  the influence of 
prior inputs in a student’s education production function, ceiling effects in the test 
instrument, and the sorting of students to teachers.  I end by considering to what extent 
value-added measures could be useful to districts in monitoring the distribution of 
effective teachers to its students and personnel decisions such as retention and 
compensation. 
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  1 
INTRODUCTION 
MOTIVATION
Spurred by a new wave of education reform marked by an emphasis on effective 
teachers as the primary lever through which school districts can raise the achievement of 
their students, school districts are increasingly looking at ways to measure the 
effectiveness of their teachers.  Previous waves of education reform focused on student 
assignment (Angrist & Lang, 2004; Godwin, Leland, Baxter, & Southworth, 2006; 
Guryan, 2004; Reber, 2007); school choice (Godwin & Kemerer, 2002), the distribution 
of resources (Hanushek, 1986, 1996); and curricular reforms and management structures  
(Ladd, Hansen, & National Research Council (U.S.). Committee on Education Finance, 
1999).  Yet many of those reforms incurred significant costs for school districts while 
failing to achieve for sustained benefits for students (Hanushek, 2003, 2006; Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 1997). 
Before the advent of standardized testing, and its mandated use prompted by the No 
Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) ("NCLB," 2001), districts did not have outcomes of 
student achievement by which they could measure teacher effectiveness across teachers 
and schools.  Instead, the districts had to rely upon what they took to be signals of teacher 
effectiveness such as credentials or the type of qualifications easily listed on a resume. 
District recruiters sought out experienced teachers with advanced degrees and national 
board certification.  The institutionalization of standardized testing led to an observable 
outcome by which districts can measure one dimension of student learning—achievement 
that can be measured by changes in standardized test scores.  Districts are discovering 
what academic researchers have been noting, although not necessarily unanimously, for 
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the last 10-15 years—credentials, or more broadly, qualifications, are not effective 
predictors of post-hire performance (Rockoff, Jacob, Kane, & Staiger, 2008).  Returns to 
experience diminish greatly after a teacher’s first 4-5 years of teaching.  Advanced 
degrees do not seem to predict effectiveness with students (Kane, Rockoff, & Staiger, 
2006).  Neither do special certifications such as National Board Certification (Cantrell, 
Fullerton, Kane, & Staiger, 2008). In fact, one often cited study of North Carolina 
teachers  suggests that these types of qualifications explain only 3% of the variation in 
effectiveness among teachers (Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997). 
The lack of pre-hire predictors of teacher effectiveness has been exacerbated by the 
lack of post-hire predictors available to school districts.  Most districts rely upon 
classroom observations of teachers by principals.  Typically a principal or her surrogate 
will observe the teacher 3-4 times over the course of a year in a single class period.  The 
principal completes a rubric, and at the end of the year, the teacher is placed in a fairly 
broad category—satisfactory versus unsatisfactory or an equivalently crude 
categorization.  These observations contain a nontrivial amount of noise.  They are 
subject to a lack of inter-rater reliability, potentially biased by the principals’ preferences 
for some teachers over others, and they are spasmodic.  
Beyond these sources of noise is a larger one that lurks in the background—a notion 
of professionalism that simultaneously holds that teaching is a profession and that 
everyone can do it.   There is a well-documented egalitarian strain within education that 
is largely unwilling to make distinctions among teachers about their performance (see, for 
example, Millman & Darling-Hammond, 1990).  As a result, approximately 98% of the 
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nation’s teachers are rated as satisfactory or better (Weisberg, Sexton, Mulhern, & 
Keeling, 2009). 
So districts face a situation in which they have little ability to know before the hire 
how effective a teacher will be, and after the hire, they are receiving reports that 98% of 
their teachers are satisfactory despite stark evidence that many children are not learning.  
In states with collective bargaining, once teachers are hired, it is very difficult to fire 
them.  Whether or not the district negotiates with a teacher union, the district often must 
abide by the tenure regulations that govern teacher employment.  For example, in North 
Carolina, teachers are granted “career status” after their fourth year of teaching.  This 
career status all but guarantees continued employment for the rest of the teacher’s career.  
In NC, approximately 90% of eligible teachers pass through their probation period into 
career status (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010).  If the teacher is subpar, then the net present 
value of the decision to grant career status is extremely high in absolute value terms both 
in terms of the costs in compensation and pensions as well as social welfare in terms of 
losses to student achievement (Staiger & Rockoff, 2010).  A bottom quartile teacher who 
is granted tenure would likely teach 26 additional years before retiring with 30 years of 
service.  Assuming an elementary teacher instructs 20 students a year, the district is 
subjecting 520 students to subpar teaching, assuming, as the evidence suggests, that the 
teachers are not likely to improve significantly after their first 4-5 years.   The economic 
costs to the students in foregone wages can be quite large.  A recent simulation study by 
Hanushek (2010) estimates that a teacher one standard deviation above the mean teacher 
would generate $400,000 in additional combined income for a classroom of twenty 
students.  Another well-publicized study that reanalyzed the earnings and postsecondary 
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outcomes of students from the Project STAR study came to similar conclusions (Chetty 
et al., 2010).  Students bear the costs of a district’s inability to identify the effectiveness 
of its teachers. 
So do teachers.  Without any strong signal of effectiveness, teachers are 
compensated on schedules laden with incentives to strengthen their qualifications—
staying in teaching to gain more years of experience, enrolling in advanced degree 
programs, obtaining special certifications.  These are the only ways in which teachers can 
improve their compensation and stay in teaching.  Yet even with these potential gains, an 
entrant into the teacher workforce will likely face a highly regulated pay scale in which 
no matter how effective they are, they are not likely to reach their earning peak for 30 
years (North Carolina Department of Public Instruction 2010).  Candidates who are more 
likely to be effective will also be more likely to select out of a profession in which their 
effectiveness will not be recognized.  This selection effect is likely to be large (Lazear, 
2003). We have evidence that this rigid salary schedule, coupled with expanding 
opportunities in other labor markets, has spurred an exodus of many potentially effective 
teachers from the field (Corcoran, Evans, & Schwab, 2004).   
The institutionalization of standardized tests coupled with the creation of 
longitudinal data systems that can now trace a student’s academic trajectory from pre-
kindergarten through graduate school has created the potential to measure teacher 
performance across schools and districts.  A literature largely dominated by economists 
has evolved over the last two decades to attempt to identify teacher effectiveness from 
changes in students’ standardized test scores from one year to the next.  Using a 
production function framework of student achievement, economists seek to parse the 
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teacher’s contribution to these changes from the observable and unobservable 
characteristics of the student, the student’s classroom or peers, and the student’s school.  
Much of the current literature is marked by statistical arguments over identification 
strategies, especially relating to endogeneity concerns.  The debate is highly technical.  
Often missing are the implications of one alternative versus another for a school district 
that wants to add a value-added measure of teacher effectiveness to its evaluation of 
teacher performance.  Academicians often spend large parts of their papers explaining 
how they arrived at their sample.  Typically they are working with large administrative 
data sets that cover a state or a large urban district.  They have large numbers of student 
observations.  They are not interested in identifying a particular teacher’s effect so much 
as they are identifying the variation in teacher effectiveness as a whole.  
KEY QUESTIONS ADDRESSED BY THE STUDY 
This study will serve as a bridge between the academy and district office.  It 
addresses three key questions faced by school districts considering the use of the value-
added measures of teacher effectiveness.  In this study, I evaluate some of the technical 
considerations that districts must consider in choosing one or more value-added models 
for human capital decisions such as recruitment, retention and compensation.  The 
district’s concerns in choosing a value-added model certainly include wanting to get the 
econometrics right.  Yet they also include implementation concerns that are not as urgent 
for the econometrician.   
The three lines of inquiry are as follows: 
1. What are the benefits and costs of various value-added models in terms of the 
identification and specification of teacher effects? 
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2. How serious are two often-cited threats to the validity of value-added 
estimates—ceiling effects in the test instrument and the sorting of teachers to 
students?  What can be done to mitigate the risks they pose? 
3. Are value-added estimates suitable for use in (a) considerations of a district’s 
equitable allocation of its resources across students, and (b) high-stakes 
personnel decisions? 
To answer the first question, I replicate a number of the models that are current in 
the literature, models that are designed to account for a particular concern, (e.g., 
measurement error).  I estimate the models and then the correlations of their teacher 
effects.  Where they are different, I try to explore why.  In assessing the benefits and 
costs, I evaluate the alternatives on their statistical properties (e.g., comparisons of model 
fit) as well as the constraints they pose on the district (e.g., requiring three years of 
student data rather than two).  I arrive at a preferred model that maximizes the number of 
teachers a district can evaluate in a way that minimizes misidentification of an individual 
teacher’s effects. 
To address the second question, I test the preferred model against two threats to 
its validity—ceiling effects in the test instrument and the sorting of students to teachers.  
Ceiling effects could bias the estimates of teachers with high proportions of students who 
scored at the high end of the distribution in the prior year.  The sorting of students to 
teachers could also bias the estimates of teachers even with robust controls for sorting on 
observables.  I test for the presence of such sorting and evaluate the magnitude and 
probability of its impact on estimates from the preferred model. 
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In answering the third question, I use the effect estimates from the preferred 
model to examine two possible policy uses of the estimates.  First, I use the estimates to 
explore the distribution of high and low value-added teachers to students both across and 
within schools.  Second, I evaluate the usefulness of the estimates for high-stakes 
decisions such as tenure or performance-based compensation. 
Section 2 reviews prior research.  Section 3 details the data.  Section 4 discusses the 
methods.  Section 5 reviews the results.  Section 6 concludes. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Over the last twenty-five years, a robust literature on the specification and use of 
value-added models has reshaped education policy.  The emergence of the value-added 
measure in policy discussions has been fueled by the creation of large longitudinal 
administrative data sets that allow researchers to utilize panel data techniques to analyze 
the effect of various educational policies.  Extensive data sets in Texas (Rivkin, 
Hanushek, & Kain, 2005), Florida (Harris & Sass, 2006), Chicago (Jacob, Lefgren, & 
Sims, 2008), North Carolina (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2006; Goldhaber, 2007) and 
New York City (Boyd, Grossman, Lankford, Loeb, & Wyckoff, 2008b) have been used 
repeatedly by groups of researchers first to test various specifications and then to assess 
potential uses of value-added estimates. 
The availability of the data has enticed economists who have both the econometric 
tools to exploit the large longitudinal data sets and a framework—the production 
function—for understanding the effect of educational inputs on student achievement.  
The work of (Hanushek, 1979; Lazear, 2001; Todd & Wolpin, 2003, 2004) posed 
education as a technology in which current and past inputs from the student, family and 
school, including the student’s unobserved endowment influence the student’s cumulative 
acquisition of knowledge.  This work, particularly that of Todd and Wolpin, illuminated 
the assumptions under which causal inferences about the relative effect of different inputs 
could be made.   
Although the production function included but was not limited to human capital 
inputs, the role of teachers quickly became the center of the research program.  The work 
of Eric Hanushek and his collaborators (1986, 1996, 2003, 2005) sparked many 
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economists to shift the research agenda away from measuring the effects of inputs such as 
programs or curricula or the allocation of financial resources.  Decades of increased 
investment in schools in terms of public expenditures spent on reducing class sizes or 
new curricula seem to have done little to increase student achievement  (Hanushek, 
2003).  Although not undisputed (Card & Krueger, 1996; Greenwald, Hedges, & Laine, 
1996; Krueger, 2003), this line of research has changed fundamentally the policy 
questions asked by districts. 
At the same time, the new administrative data sets have allowed researchers to 
uncover the effect of teachers on student achievement, at least the type of student 
achievement that can be measured by a standardized test.  In a recent review of the 
literature, Hanushek and Rivkin (2010b) summarize the consistent finding across studies 
of significant differences among teachers in their effect on student achievement.  These 
studies, from different researches using different data sets, consistently show that that a 
one standard deviation difference in teacher effectiveness results in changes in student 
achievement of 0.11-0.36 student-level standard deviations.  To put the magnitude of 
these effects into perspective, the Tennessee STAR experiment yielded effect sizes of 0.2 
student level standard deviations for decreasing class sizes from 22 to 15 students 
(Krueger, 2003).   
Table 2 summarizes the canonical studies that formed the first wave of value-added 
research.  These value-added studies were structured similarly.  They compared different 
specifications of the models to test their sensitivity to changes in the specification.  The 
work centered on assumptions about the decay of prior inputs, the form of teacher effects 
(random or fixed), and ways to handle the unobserved endowment of the student.  Many 
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of these papers were not testing hypotheses about policies, but rather specifying different 
possibilities for the actual estimate and then gauging the impact of those different 
specifications on the results.   
Although this literature did not result in a consensus on the proper specification of 
value-added models, there have been few papers since these that focus on the overall 
specification of the models.  A consensus seems to have emerged that controlling for 
student, classroom, or school characteristics is less a technical issue and more of a policy 
issue (for an exception, see Ballou, Sanders, & Wright, 2004).  Similarly, the decision 
about whether to model school heterogeneity through school fixed effects is also cast as a 
policy decision concerning how the estimates will be used (e.g., for cross-school 
comparisons).  A consensus has emerged that the teacher estimates must be shrunken of 
their sampling variation through either one of several variations of empirical Bayes 
estimators or by using the correlations of the adjacent year teacher effects (I will discuss 
this technique in the Methods section). 
The one specification issue where there seems to be ongoing disagreement is how to 
deal with measurement error in the test.  An oft-cited recent paper  argues for the use of 
dynamic panel data estimators  to deal adequately with the potential of measurement 
error in the pretest to render the teacher effect estimates inconsistent (Andrabi, Das, 
Khwaja, & Zajonc, 2009).  Similarly Boyd et al. (2008a) argue for an alternative 
approach to dealing with the measurement error that exploits the covariance structure of 
the tests.   
As considerations about the fine points of the specifications have subsided, a newer 
literature is examining threats to validity of the teacher effect estimates that would pertain 
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across most specifications.  The most controversial of these critiques is that introduced by 
Jesse Rothstein in two recent papers (Rothstein, 2009, 2010).  In these papers, Rothstein 
uses a North Carolina administrative dataset to test the strict exogeneity assumptions of 
the value-added approaches.  He conducts a falsification test such as that suggested by  
Todd and Wolpin (2003) and finds that the distribution of effects of the teachers at time 
t+1 on students at time t are almost as large as those of the teacher at time t, leading him 
to conclude that sorting of teachers to students renders estimates of the teacher effects 
biased and inconsistent.  His critique has gained great traction in the policy community 
(for example, see Baker et al., 2010). 
Among economists, Rothstein’s critique generated a vigorous response.  Koedel and 
Betts (2009a) replicate his results and show how adding additional years of data to in 
calculating the teacher’s effect mitigates the bias completely.  Others such as Hanushek 
(2009) have shown that the impact of the teacher at t+1 on the student at time t is actually 
a function of tracking of students to teachers on the basis of test scores. 
A recent experimental study by Kane and Staiger (2008) conducted an experiment in 
which pairs of teachers in Los Angeles were randomly assigned to classrooms within 
their schools.  Kane and Staiger used the strength of the relationship of the difference in 
the value-added of the teachers pre- and post-random assignment as a measure of the 
robustness of the specification against the threat of sorting to students.  They found that 
pre-experimental models that included peer effects but excluded student fixed effects 
yielded results that were not statistically different from the experimental differences in 
the teacher’s value-added. Thus, in their relatively small study, they were able to 
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conclude that sorting of students was not biasing the estimates of teacher effects.  It is 
unclear whether the findings would generalize to other districts. 
A second line of critiques returns to the assumptions of value-added models that are 
rooted in production function framework  (Ishii & Rivkin, 2009; Reardon & Raudenbush, 
2009).  The concerns include the difficulty value-added models have in accounting for 
the joint production of achievement by teachers within the same school; the assumption 
that all prior inputs decay geometrically at the same rate; and more generally what they 
hold to be violations of the assumptions of strict exogeneity. 
A third line of inquiry surrounds the assumption that economists estimating value-
added models are ignoring properties of the test (Koretz, 2002; McCaffrey, Lockwood, 
Koretz, & Hamilton, 2003).  They argue that academic researchers are treating the test as 
a prima facie indicator of student achievement when in fact the properties of the can 
render results between students incomparable.  For example, tests may not be scaled on 
an interval basis so that movement along one part of the distribution could be easier than 
another.  This line of argument can be summarized by concerns of the psychometricians 
that their tests are being used for a purpose—evaluating teachers—for which they were 
not intended. 
Beyond these arguments about the specification of the value-added models, 
researchers are engaged in a heated debate about the proper use of the value-added 
estimates.  This debate is largely being fought through competing reports written by 
academics for policy think tanks.  These reports are passed along in the policy circles as 
evidence that researchers cannot agree on the proper use of the estimates.  Perhaps the 
most prominent one was published by the Economic Policy Institute (Baker, et al., 2010).  
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It critiques the emphasis on value-added measures for their imprecision, inability to 
account for summer loss, sorting of students to teachers, incentives to narrow curriculum 
to tested subjects, and inability to control for factors outside the teacher’s control.   A 
panel from the National Academy of Science reached similar conclusions (Chudowsky, 
Koenig, Braun, National Research Council (U.S.). Center for Education., & National 
Academy of Education., 2010). 
 The Brookings Institution issues a  rejoinder paper  (Glazerman, Loeb, Goldhaber, 
Raudenbush, & Whitehurst, 2010).  The counter argument in this and other similar policy 
briefs is to accentuate the counterfactual in which current teacher evaluation systems do 
not generally distinguish among teachers.  Although it is not a perfect measure, it does 
add information for the district policy maker that is not available from the customary 
proxies of teacher effectiveness such as national board certification, advanced degrees, or 
years of experience. 
 Although some of the literature around uses of value-added estimates has focused 
on the placement of teachers (Clotfelter, Ladd, & Vigdor, 2005; Clotfelter, et al., 2006; 
Hanushek & Rivkin, 2010a), more has focused on the use of value-added estimates to 
inform high-stakes personnel decisions.  In the context of national cutbacks in the teacher 
workforce, several studies simulate how districts might employ value-added results in 
hiring and firing decisions (Goldhaber & Hansen, 2010; Staiger & Rockoff, 2010; Yeh & 
Ritter, 2009).  Another line of research involves the use of value-added estimates to 
inform performance-based compensation systems (Roland G. Fryer, 2011; Lazear, 2003; 
Neal, 2011; Podgursky & Springer, 2007; Springer et al., 2010) 
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There are far fewer studies that illuminate the policy decisions districts face in 
adopting one or more value-added models.  A recent overview for policymakers (Harris, 
2011) should help districts assess the strengths and weakness of value-added measures.  
The greatest contribution to districts has come from the work of McCaffrey et al. of the 
RAND Corporation (McCaffrey, Han, & Lockwood, 2010; McCaffrey, et al., 2003; 
Steele, Hamilton, & Stecher, 2010).  
McCaffrey, Han and Lockwood provide perhaps the most useful guidance. 
They walk districts through a number of decisions ranging from matching teachers and 
students to different estimators.  They list a number of considerations for the business 
rules of matching teachers and students that a district should establish (e.g., the number 
of days a student must be enrolled with the teacher in order to be attributed to the 
teacher).  Then, the authors test several models—regression residuals, ANCOVA, Look-
Up Tables, Gain Scores, Multivariate ANCOVA, Mixed Models, and student fixed 
effects—for their sensitivity to bias due to sorting and their relative degree of precision.  
They find that the mixed models and student fixed effects generally produce more precise 
and less biased estimates of teacher effects.   Finally, the authors explore the implication 
of the uncertainty in the estimates for decision rules about who would qualify for a bonus. 
This study extends McCaffrey, Han and Lockwood to help districts align their 
decisions on value-added models to their policy goals.  From issues of covariate selection 
to the form of the estimated teacher effects, it evaluates many of the statistical concerns 
from the academy by criteria—technical, practical, political—which are of significant 
concern to the district. It addresses directly to specific doubts often raised in districts 
concerning the validity of value-added models—ceiling effects and the sorting of 
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teachers to students.  Finally, it goes beyond the current literature in exploring how the 
value-added effects could be used as measures of equity within a school district. 
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DATA 
This study employs data from an administrative data set supplied by Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) that includes cohorts of students in grades 5-8 during the 
period 2008-2010.  It contains information on the students, their courses and teachers, 
and their schools.  
STUDENTS 
Data on the students include their demographic characteristics, test score history, 
enrollment patterns (e.g., mobility between schools), attendance and behavioral record.   
The demographic data on students include their gender, English proficiency, designation 
as academically gifted by the district, ethnicity, special education designation, and age 
relative to their peers.  Unlike many data sets used in similar studies, the data do not 
include an indicator of the student’s eligibility for free or reduced lunch, the usual proxy 
for a student’s socio-economic background.  Due to legal constraints, the district no 
longer allows researchers access to this information.  
Student test scores are from the standardized end-of-grade tests administered by 
the NC Department of Public Instruction (NCDPI) 3-4 weeks prior to the conclusion of 
the school year.  These are norm-referenced tests that measure student mastery of the NC 
Standard Course of Study for that grade and subject.  NCDPI converts the students’ raw 
scores to scale scores that are designed to be vertically linked across grades and to 
possess the property of interval scaling such that a one point increase in the scale score 
reflects the same amount of learning across the scale score distribution.  Following 
general practice, I standardize the scale scores by grade and year so that the scores have 
mean of zero and unit variation.  Students who fail the tests are allowed, and in some 
17 
 
cases, required, to take a re-test often within the week of the first test.  I use the score 
from the first administration.
1
  There are also a number of accommodations given to 
students with special needs.  These range from having extended time on the test to taking 
alternate forms of the test.  In this study, I use only those students who take the regular 
administration of the test. 
The data also contain information on the student’s enrollment in school.  They 
indicate whether a student is repeating a grade, is enrolled in a school for the first time 
and/or has changed schools within the academic year.  Data on the student attendance 
include the number of absences as well as the number of days enrolled in school within 
the year. The data also include the percentage of time the student spent in out-of-school 
or in-school suspension during the year.  
COURSES 
As with many urban districts, Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools establishes the link 
between students and teachers through course registration data entered by the school  
through the scheduling interface of the student information system.  There is a record for 
each student in each course period.  The record contains the name of the course, an 
associated course code provided by the state, a course code specific to CMS, the course 
day and period, and an associated instructor.  In NC, end-of-course standardized tests are 
required for any student who is enrolled in courses with a given state course code.  For 
example, any student enrolled after the 20th day of the term in a course with a 2001 state 
course code must take the end-of-grade math test.  Researchers seeking to establish the 
                                                 
1
 Using a subsequent attempt introduces the effect of taking the test a second time into the 
student’s score.  Another alternative—averaging the test and the retest—changes the 
underlying variance of the score. 
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primary teacher for the student in the tested subject often default to the teacher listed by 
this course code.  This assumption may not always hold for a variety of reasons. 
First, student mobility among classrooms threatens the validity of teacher-student 
matches.  When these students move, their course records are overwritten by the student 
information system.  So, for example, a researcher who pulls the course table at the end 
of the school year will not observe the students’ course enrollments in their previous 
schools.  Aside from being unable to apportion the student’s instructional dosage among 
more than one teacher, the researcher’s calculations of the composition of the student’s 
peers can be invalid.   The mobile student may have been enrolled in the first term with 
Teacher A in Class B at School C, but when computing the classroom averages for that 
class, the student will not contribute to those peer means. 
A similar overwriting happens at CMS when a student withdraws from school.  The 
course records of students who withdraw from the district are purged from the course 
data, making it impossible to include them in ex post calculations of peer means. To the 
extent that these students are clustered in certain schools or among certain teachers, their 
omission from the data could bias estimates of the teacher effects, especially if their 
withdrawal was endogenous to the teacher’s effect.   
A second risk of invalid teacher-student matches stems from within-year teacher 
mobility.  A teacher may leave the school and a new teacher takes over.  If the school 
administrator does not update the database, the teacher of record will be the first teacher.  
Or suppose a teacher takes maternity leave.  The student may have an interim teacher or 
the student’s class may be instructed by a principal or other group of teachers who fill in 
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for the teacher.  This type of arrangement will likely never be recorded in the 
administrative dataset and will be unobservable to the district office.   
A third threat to the validity of the teacher-student matches arises from non-
traditional teacher arrangements.  The scheduling software used by CMS presupposes 
static groupings of students with one or two teachers.  Yet increasingly in its elementary 
schools, CMS principals and teachers are using more dynamic groupings of teachers and 
students.  For example, the principals may have all 5
th
 grade students instructed in math 
by one 5
th
 grade teacher who is particularly adept at math.  They may or may not record 
this change in the student information system, even if the system allows this type of 
input.  Or principals might adopt a type of flexible grouping approach where students are 
grouped into small subsets of the class based on instructional needs and then regrouped 
every few weeks.  Each iteration of the groups could have a different instructor. 
A final difficulty in matching students and teachers arises from students having 
varying exposures to different teachers in the same subject.  Some low-performing 
students in a class are pulled out by a resource teacher or specialist for intensive 
instruction in reading.   There is a similar problem with students having varying amounts 
of time with the same teacher.  For example, a student could be enrolled in a math course 
that has a lab component taught either by the same teacher or by a different one.  If it is 
taught by the same teacher, and this is not a standardized practice across the district, then 
the teacher has greater exposure to the student than the teacher’s peers.  To the extent that 
the teacher’s effectiveness is linked to the time with the student, this could conflate time 
and effectiveness and make comparisons among teachers difficult.  Note that this could 
also be a problem if retained students have the same teacher from the prior year.  In some 
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cases, researchers using large state administrative data sets cannot observe these 
complementary teachers.  When they do, they often drop students with multiple 
instructors from the sample.     
Table 3 summarizes the exposure of students to multiple dosages of teachers and 
subjects within a term in 2010.  Of the 42,552 students in grades 5-8 in the sample for 
that year, 51% had only one math course in the year and 48% had two math-related 
courses.  Most of the students with two math-related courses had the same teacher for 
both.  Eleven percent of the sample had two math-related courses with two different 
teachers. 
Notwithstanding the potential threats to the validity of the teacher-student matches, I 
calculated the classroom means by aggregating the individual student data to the 
classroom level while excluding each individual student from his/her classroom mean. 
SCHOOLS 
Similarly, I aggregated all individual data to the school level to create school-
level means.  In addition, I included the school’s percentage of students who are eligible 
for free or reduced lunch.  This measure could influence student achievement in two 
possibly opposite directions.  The school’s free and reduced lunch eligible population is 
an indicator of the needs of its students—needs that are correlated negatively with the 
student’s academic achievement.  At the same time, this percentage is a trigger for a 
school’s receipt of Title I funds from the federal government.  This funding is tied to 
smaller class sizes or access to technology such as smart boards that could conceivably be 
correlated with improved instruction. 
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ARRIVING AT THE SAMPLE 
This section outlines the steps I took to arrive at the estimation samples.   First, I 
selected all CMS students in grades 5-8 during the period 2008-2010 from the master 
student file (N=160,527).  I began with grade 5 because I want to have two prior test 
scores available for each student. 
Second, I merged these students with the test score file.  I summarized the 
demographic characteristics of the 11.4% of students who are missing a test score on the 
regular administration of the test in math in the current year and report this in column 1 
of Table 4 (N=18,285).   These students are more likely to be special education students 
who would not take the regular administration or students who scored much lower than 
their peers in prior years. 
Third, I merged these students with the course file, again summarizing the 
characteristics of the students who are not found in the course file in column 2 of Table 4.  
There are 21,893 students who do not have course records (13,785 of these also had no 
current year test score). Of the 21,893 with no course data, CMS records 438 students 
dropping out or being expelled and 12,460 students transferring out of the district during 
the year.  These students’ course data is wiped from the student information system at the 
end of the school year as a result of a business rule in the student information system 
updating procedure.  There are another 9,407 students for whom I do not have any 
withdrawal data; of these, 8,032 were in eighth grade.  These eighth-graders who 
disappear from the data are evenly distributed across the years 2008-2010. 
Fourth, I divided the remaining students (those with a current year test score and 
course enrollment data, N=120,349) into three groups and summarize their characteristics 
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in columns 3-5 of Table 4. Column 3 provides means and standard deviations for the 
28,513 students who were missing a prior year test score.  Columns 4-5 summarize the 
characteristics of students who have a score in the prior year and do not have one at t-2 
(column 4) or do (column 5).   
Columns 3-5 show that students who are missing one or two prior test scores differ 
significantly on observable characteristics from students who do have these scores.  
Students missing a score in the prior year score (column 3) score on average almost one-
third of a standard deviation lower on the current year test than those who are not missing 
it (column 6).  They are more likely to be special education students, older than their 
peers due to previous year retentions, and in their first year in the school.   Their 
classmates scored on average one-fourth of a standard deviation lower than others in that 
grade and were far more likely to be special education students. 
  Among those students with scores from the prior years, those without a score from 
two years prior (column 4) differ significantly from those with a score from two years 
prior (column 5).  They score significantly lower on the current year test as well as the 
prior year.  They are more likely to be designated as having limited English proficiency 
(LEP), older than their peers, in their first year at the school and Hispanic.  They are 
much less likely to be labeled as academically gifted.  Many of these differences extend 
to their classes as well.  The difference in their classroom mean math scores from the 
prior year is almost 0.15 standard deviations. 
The differences in test scores among the students summarized in columns 3-5 
extends beyond central tendencies.   Figure 1 shows the kernel densities of current year 
test scores for the students summarized in columns 3-5.  The distribution of current year 
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scores for students missing scores from the last two years is well to the left of students 
who are not missing those scores.  A similar pattern holds for students who have a score 
from the prior year but not two years prior.   
The magnitude of the differences among these students has policy implications for 
the district’s decisions on the how to handle missing data on prior test scores.  All value-
added models rely upon having at least two years of achievement data to estimate a 
student’s growth, from which the teacher’s effect is derived.  An identification strategy 
for teacher effectiveness that excludes these students from the analysis leads to several 
potential problems.  First, assuming that the district would impose a floor on the number 
of students a teacher must instruct in order to compute an effectiveness measure, 
excluding these students could lead to some teachers being left out of the analysis 
altogether.  Second, some teachers will have a mix of students who are returning and who 
are new to the district. If a district excludes the new students from the teacher’s 
calculation, it could be estimating the teachers’ effect on only a relatively small 
proportion of their students.     
The CMS data allows me to gauge the magnitude of these threats.  Requiring each 
student to have two prior scores eliminates 156 teachers and 1,060 classrooms from the 
value-added calculation over three years.  For teachers who do not drop out the sample, 
the requirement of students having two prior year scores results in a median loss of 4 
students per year from a median teaching load of 56 students per year (three of the four 
grades in the sample are in middle school).  I will compare estimates of teacher effects 
that include and exclude students without two prior scores as a way estimate the 
difference it will make for teachers who are not excluded from the sample. 
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One alternative to excluding students with missing data from the sample is an 
imputation procedure, and this has both statistical and practical concerns.  Districts are 
likely equipped to handle simple single imputation.   However, the multiple imputation 
technique recommended as a best practice in the statistics literature is more difficult to 
compute, especially in combination with more sophisticated estimators (e.g., multilevel 
models) (Rubin, 1996).  Aside from the computational considerations, the rationale for 
imputing the prior values is hard for district analysts to explain to teachers, especially 
when high stakes are attached to the estimate of a particular teacher’s estimate.  In this 
study, I leave the issue of how to deal with missing data through imputation for further 
research.    
I use as the estimation sample students who have a score in the prior year and who 
may or may not have two prior scores and who have non-missing values on other 
variables.  These students are summarized in column 7 of Table 4.   
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This section details the methods used to explore the three central lines of inquiry of 
this study.  These lines of inquiry are: 
1. What are the benefits and costs of various value-added models in terms of the 
identification and specification of teacher effects? 
2. How serious are two often-cited threats to the validity of value-added 
estimates—ceiling effects in the test instrument and the sorting of teachers to 
students?  What can be done to mitigate the risks they pose? 
3. Are value-added estimates suitable for use in (a) considerations of a district’s 
equitable allocation of its resources across students, and (b) personnel 
decisions? 
INTRODUCTION 
It can be useful to begin with the simple question that value-added estimates of 
teacher effectiveness are seeking to answer:  what would happen to the test scores of the 
students in a given classroom if they had one teacher rather than another (Kane & Staiger, 
2008)?    To answer this question, a district would need to have multiple teachers 
teaching the same group of students in the same school at the same time of day.  The 
district could then conclude that under ceteris paribus conditions, the difference in the 
student test scores at the end of the course would be the teacher’s effect relative to the 
other teachers.  This, of course, is impossible, but framing it this way points to what from 
a potential outcomes framework, Holland calls the fundamental problem of causal 
inference—someone cannot simultaneously receive the treatment and not receive the 
treatment at the same time (Holland, 1986). 
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One option would be to create an experiment.
2
  The district could randomly assign 
teachers to students within the same school and grade.  If the experimental conditions 
held, it could attribute the differences in the student test scores to the teacher.  In this 
case, from a potential outcomes framework, the district would assume: 
 0ijt tE A      (1) 
where ijtA  is the achievement of student i with teacher j at time t and θ is student’s 
teacher at time t.  From the perspective of the potential outcomes framework, the district 
would be looking at a specific teacher as a treatment effect (see Imbens & Wooldridge, 
2009; Rubin, Stuart, & Zanutto, 2004).  In Equation (1), it would assume that all 
differences among the students’ test scores arose from the treatment. 
The plausibility of this assumption is easily challenged.  A long line of literature 
casts student achievement in terms of a production function in which the teacher’s input 
is just one of many factors (Hanushek, 1986 ; Harris & Sass, 2006; Lazear, 2001; Todd & 
Wolpin, 2003).   These factors include aspects of the child’s neighborhood, home life, 
socio-economic status—factors largely beyond the control of the school district—as well 
as those factors that the school can control—the assigned school, peers and teacher. 
Todd and Wolpin (2003) provide one of the seminal explanations of the 
educational production function and the assumptions required to identify the contribution 
                                                 
2
 Experimental estimates of teacher effects based upon random assignments of teachers to 
classrooms are both relatively rare and usually limited in scope. Researchers from 
Mathematica used random assignment to assess impact of Teach for America teachers, 
see Glazerman, S., Mayer, D., & Decker, P. (2006). Alternative routes to teaching: The 
impacts of teach for america on student achievement and other outcomes. Journal of 
Policy Analysis and Management, 25(1), 75-96.  For a critique of the reluctance of school 
districts to use random assignment, see Cook, T. D. (2003). Why have educational 
evaluators chosen not to do randomized experiments? Annals of the American Academy 
of Political and Social Science, 589, 114-149.. 
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of any one input.  Adapting their argument, I specify a basic education production 
function as follows: 
 [ ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ( ), ]ijt t i it i ijt ijt ijt i iA A t t t t t t c t e  F Y Z C S  (2) 
where A is the academic achievement of student i with teacher j at time t.  F is a vector of 
student i’s family inputs to the student’s achievement, Y is a vector of student inputs that 
are time-varying, Z is a vector of time-invariant student inputs, C is a vector of classroom 
level inputs; S is a vector of school inputs; θ is the teacher; c is the unobserved 
“endowment” or “heterogeneity” of the student, and e is a random error term.  In this 
formulation, the t subscripts denote the presence of the input at time t, making explicit 
that the effect of the input could vary by time.  For example, the student’s unobserved 
endowment ci is time invariant and yet its impact on student achievement could vary with 
time.  In contrast, the student’s classroom C-ijt is both time-varying and its effect could 
depend on time, e.g., a student may be more influenced by the peer composition of the 
class in third grade than in the eighth. 
For researchers using even the rich administrative data sets that have come to 
dominate the last ten years of research on value-added models, some of these inputs are 
often unobservable.  How does a district know how to estimate the family’s input into 
education save for a few proxies such as the decision to enroll in a magnet school or the 
student’s eligibility for free or reduced lunch?  To the extent that these unobserved inputs 
are correlated to the observed inputs and to the student’s achievement, then estimates of 
the observed inputs, including the teacher effects, are likely to be inconsistent.   
Turning to a regression framework for estimating Equation (2), I simplify the 
notation by temporarily collapsing inputs so that , F,Y,Z,C S X  to get: 
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 1 , 1 2 1 1 1... ... ,  for 1,...,ijt ijt ij t ij t i ijtA c t T                 X X X  (3) 
where αt is the estimated effect of the inputs X at time t, λ is the effect of the teacher at 
time t, β is the effect of the student’s endowment and ε is a random error term.  This 
formulation makes explicit the potential effects of prior inputs on the student’s current 
achievement.  A student’s achievement at a given time, t, is an additive function of 
current and past realizations of the family, student, and school inputs, as well as a fixed 
contribution from the student endowment ci and an error term that at this point I cannot 
assume is i.i.d.  
For a number of reasons, estimation of Equation (3) is unfeasible. School districts 
do not observe the contemporaneous or lagged inputs from the child’s family.  In fact, 
school districts do not even approach observing a complete set of the prior schooling 
inputs.  The risk of not accounting for these lagged inputs is that the current year inputs 
could be endogenous, rendering the estimates of the impact of contemporaneous inputs 
(e.g., the teacher effect) inconsistent and biased.   
At this point, it may be useful to frame just what is at stake in the violations of the 
exogeneity assumption. The estimation of Equation (3) is a student-level estimation of 
the impact of the teacher effect on the student’s achievement.  Yet the parameter of 
interest for a district is not the particular impact of the teacher on that student’s learning, 
but rather the impact of that teacher across all the teacher’s students. By aggregating 
Equation (3) across the teacher’s students it becomes possible to distinguish more readily 
between noise and bias.  The noise at the level of Equation (3) may not result in bias 
when these are aggregated to the teacher.     In this framework, I rework Equation (1) to 
the teacher level so that: 
30 
 
 
1 1
| 0,  for all i=1...N and j=1...J
J N
ijt ijt
j i
E E A 
 
 
    
 
  (4) 
where i is student of teacher j at time t.  
PREVIEW OF ANALYSES 
The analyses in the study will proceed in three steps: (1) arriving at a preferred 
model for the estimation of teacher effects, (2) testing that based model against threats to 
validity common to most value-added models, and (3) exploring the policy implications 
of the resulting teacher effects.  Table 1 summarizes the analyses. 
TABLE 1:  Sequence of Analyses. 
Sequence of Analysis 
 
Arriving at a preferred model 
 Dealing with lagged score 
 Accounting for student heterogeneity 
 Accounting for school heterogeneity 
 Accounting for classroom heterogeneity 
 Modeling teacher effects 
 
Testing the preferred model 
 Prior Inputs 
 Ceiling Effects 
 Sorting of Teachers to Students 
 
Policy Implications 
 Distributing teachers to students 
 Personnel Decisions  
 
ARRIVING AT A PREFERRED MODEL 
In this section I build a preferred model for estimating teacher effects that I use to 
assess threats to the validity of the inferences about teacher effects and policy 
implications.  In creating the preferred model, I cover four primary issues: (1) ways to 
handle the inclusion of the student’s prior test score, (2) options for controlling for 
student heterogeneity, (3) options for school heterogeneity, and (4) estimating teacher 
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effects.  In order to limit the number of analyses, I do not estimate every permutation of 
the available options.  Instead, I consider only those options that seem likely to be 
consequential for the resulting effects. 
Dealing with the Lagged Score 
I begin building the preferred model by evaluating three common approaches to 
using the student’s prior test score: as a lagged dependent variable, a gainscore and 
instrumenting for the lagged score with the twice lagged score.  In evaluating these 
alternatives, I need to hold constant some of the other options (e.g., how to account for 
school heterogeneity) that will be discussed later in this section.  In this first step, I 
estimate the teacher effects as fixed and conditioned on student characteristics.  In the 
absence of a statistical test with which to compare the results of the models, I evaluate the 
approaches by the constraints on the sample imposed by the approach (e.g., needing three 
years of student data vs. two) and the extent to which their resulting estimates are 
correlated and. I turn now to a discussion of rationale for each option. 
Models 1-2: Lagged Prior Score(s) 
To capture the effect of past inputs on student achievement, many researchers 
include one or more lagged test scores in estimating some form of: 
 1 , 1 2 , 2[ ] ,  for all 2,...,ijt ij t ij t ijt ijt i ijtA A A c t T           X  (5) 
The premise is that the lagged score accounts for the accumulative effect of all prior 
inputs including the student’s endowment, which is unobserved.   
Although including the prior year score may help in mitigating the bias caused by 
being unable to account for prior inputs to the student’s achievement, including it 
introduces three new threats to the validity of the estimated teacher effects.  First, 
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suppose it were the case that the unobserved endowment’s effect on the score was not 
static over time.  If the lagged score captures the unobserved endowment, then I am 
assuming that the correlation between the score and endowment is the same in all time 
periods.  This assumption can be written as  
 
, 1 1 1
0 : ,  for i j
ijt ij t ijt t i i ijt
i j
A A c
H
    
 
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 
X
 (6) 
It is conceivable that this would not be the case.  Could smarter children grow faster than 
their peers, even conditional on the prior score?  If so, then the coefficient on the lagged 
score will be biased upward (Andrabi, et al., 2009).   
A second assumption of the models including lagged prior scores is that the effect 
of the student endowment is constant across time.  This assumption can be expressed as: 
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 (7) 
If this assumption does not hold, then the coefficient on the lagged score would need to 
vary by time or grade if it is to capture the impact of the student endowment on student 
achievement.  I assume Equation (7) holds for the purposes of this study.   
 A third assumption with the inclusion of the lagged score is that the coefficient on 
the lagged score is constant across all students in the sample.  One can allow the 
functional form of the lagged score to vary by including quadratic and cubic polynomials 
so that the coefficient could vary depending on where the student’s prior score lies in the 
distribution of scores (see Figure 2 for the relationship between test scores at t-2 and t, 
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and t-1 and t).  Yet this still homogenizes the trajectories of the students.  One way to 
mitigate this constraint is to include the second lagged score from t-2.  In addition to 
allowing for more of a trajectory, having two prior scores should help to minimize the 
effects of measurement error in the prior scores.  I estimate Equation (5) with the t-2 
score included as well.  I report the results in column 2 of Table 5.   
Model 3: IV Estimates 
Models that include a lagged test score on the left-hand-side are subject to bias in 
the estimated teacher effect due to measurement error in the lagged score.  The lagged 
test score is an additive function of the true score and measurement error.  This 
measurement error could result from many things: the student could have had a bad 
testing day or the test just happened to have questions that the student was well-equipped 
to answer.  The measurement error invites two potential problems.  First, it increases the 
noise in the estimate of the coefficient on the lagged score and attenuates that coefficient.  
Second, it also renders OLS estimates of teacher effect estimates using a lagged score 
inconsistent by inducing correlation between the error term and the lagged score 
(Andrabi, et al., 2009; Harris & Sass, 2006).  
Perhaps the most straightforward solution to the first problem—the attenuation of 
the coefficient on the prior score—would be to correct for the measurement issue by 
using a known estimate of the reliability of the assessment from the testing service.  
However, many districts may not have access to the reliability of the assessment  In this 
study, I do not pursue solutions to using estimates of the reliability of the of the prior 
score in the estimation of the prior scores (Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, Wyckoff, & Grossman, 
2008).  I do pursue an approach often used to correct for the inconsistency wrought by 
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having the lagged score correlated with the error term.  This approach is to instrument for 
the score at t-1 with that of t-2. 
 , 1 ,  for all 3,...,ijt ij t ijt ijt i ijtA A c t T        X  (8) 
I estimate Equation (8) using a 2SLS estimator and report the results in column 3 of 
Table 5. 
Model 4: Gainscore 
As a final option, I estimate a gainscore specification.   In this specification the 
dependent variable becomes the change rather than the level of the score.  The intuition is 
that by moving the lagged score from the right-hand-side to the left, you solve the 
measurement error issue.   
 , 1 ,  for all 2,...,ijt ij t ijt ijt i ijtA A c t T       X  (9) 
In order to understand the drawbacks of such an approach, it helps to consider the 
specific interpretation of the coefficient on the prior year test score.  It can be construed 
as a measure of the decay of academic achievement from one year to the next.   
 , 1ijt ij t ijt ijt i ijtA A c      X  (10) 
Jacob, Lefgren and Sims (2008) show that this coefficient could be the decay of long 
term learning but also measurement error and short-term cramming for test.   
Under most plausible assumptions about the nature of learning, a district could 
assume that 0 1  .  If λ=0, then it is assuming complete decay such that no inputs 
from the prior year would have an impact on achievement in the current year.  If λ=1, this 
implies that there is no decay in learning from one year to the next.  The gainscore model 
effectively constrains λ to one.    The implication of this constraint is that the effect of an 
input is independent of the time that it is applied, leading Andrabi et al. to conclude:  
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"...this implies that the effect of each input must be independent of when it is 
applied...For example, the quality of a child's kindergarten must have the same impact on 
their achievement at the end of age 5 as it does on their achievement at age 18” (2009, p. 
8) . 
Their critique is supported by empirical evidence that the effects of teacher effects do not 
in fact persist without decay (Andrabi, et al., 2009; Jacob, et al., 2008; Kane & Staiger, 
2008). 
While not disputing the implications of the complete decay assumption, Harris and 
Sass (2006) test the degree to which the constraint changes estimated teacher effects.  
They estimate specifications in which the lagged achievement variable's coefficient is 
constrained to various levels of decay. They find the teacher effects are highly correlated 
(r=0.88) regardless of the constraint.    They conclude that the benefits of dealing with 
measurement error outweigh the cost of the complete decay assumption.  I report the 
results of this estimation in column 4 of Table 5. 
Accounting for Student Heterogeneity 
The prior test score captures some but not all of the student heterogeneity.  I begin by 
addressing the heterogeneity of a teacher’s students along four dimensions represented in 
Equation (2).  These include their unobserved endowment or innate ability, c,; their 
unobserved family inputs such as the parental support of their education, F; time-
invariant characteristics, Z, such as a student’s gender; and time-varying student 
characteristics, Y, such as their absence rate.  The primary question for the district is the 
extent to which these variables explain enough of the student’s unobserved characteristics 
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to mitigate substantially the risk that these variables could bias the estimates of the 
teacher effects. 
Many of the common value-added models adjust for student characteristics that 
are both time-invariant and time-varying.  These characteristics can include 
demographics (e.g., ethnicity, socio-economic status and gender), behavior (e.g., 
discipline and attendance), and enrollment patterns (e.g., between-school mobility).  In 
the estimation of the models above that deal with the lagged score, I include sets of time-
varying and time-invariant student covariates.  I use F-tests of the joint significance of 
each set of characteristics a measure of their contribution to the model.   I report the 
results in columns 1-4 of Table 5. 
I discuss two sources of unobservable student heterogeneity.  One of the most 
significant sources of variation among students in their achievement is the family level 
inputs that are largely unobservable to the district.  We know empirically that these inputs 
matter and that they include factors ranging from the number of books in a household 
(Roland G. Fryer & Levitt, 2004; Roland G.  Fryer & Levitt, 2006) to the child’s 
grandmother’s education (Phillips, Brooks-Gunn, Duncan, Klebanov, & Crance, 1998).    
A second source of unobserved student heterogeneity is the student’s own innate 
ability.  This endowment could affect both the level scores in a given year and the rate of 
change of scores across years.  I assume that both sources of unobserved heterogeneity 
would influence a student’s achievement in a given year.  The threat of these sources of 
unobserved student heterogeneity to estimates of teacher effects depends upon the extent 
to which they are also correlated with contemporaneous inputs to the student’s 
achievements.  They might have two types of relationships to the current inputs that 
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could classified as static and dynamic.  Imagine that the student has parents who are very 
engaged in the student’s education and provide outside-of-school opportunities for the 
child that would influence the child’s achievement, perhaps even before entering school.  
I assume that this sort of parent input could be consistent over time and that its effect on 
the student’s achievement is also similarly constant. 
Parental input could also have a more dynamic nature.  Suppose the student of 
highly engaged parents has an off year and receives an unusually low score in math.  In 
this case, the parents may respond by securing a tutor for the child.  If we imagine the 
mean parental involvement in the student’s education over the years, then in this year, 
there would be a positive deviation from this mean that could easily be confused with the 
teacher’s input in that year.  How can the district account for the difference in the input of 
the tutor and the student’s math teacher in that year? 
There is little the district can do to account for time-varying unobservables such 
as the dynamic response by parents to inputs.  Instead, I explore the potential of student 
fixed effects and first differences to capture student unobservables beyond those captured 
by the lagged scores and observable student characteristics in the previous models.  The 
former identifies the impact of the inputs on a student’s achievement by predicting 
deviations from the student’s average academic achievement with the deviations of the 
inputs from their average for the student:   
  2( ) ,  for all 3,...,i iijt it i ijtA t T         X X  (11) 
The latter identifies the effect of the inputs from changes in the inputs from one year to 
the next.   
 , 1 , 1 1 ,  for all 3,...,ijt t ijt t t ijtA t T         X  (12) 
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In this study, I estimate both student fixed effects and first differences and report the 
results in columns 5-6 of Table 5.   
Approaches to estimating teacher effects that depend on panel data from students 
are likely to invite serial correlation into the error term.  The intuition is that the 
unobserved endowment will be correlated with both the lagged score and the current 
score.  If this were true, it would violate the assumption of strict exogeneity on which the 
panel approach to accounting for unobserved student heterogeneity depends.  In this 
study, I test for the presence of serial correlation using Stata’s –xtserial— program which 
is based upon a test developed by Jeffrey Wooldridge (Drukker, 2003).  This test is 
predicated on the assumption that if the errors are uncorrelated, they should be correlated 
at -0.5 in a first difference estimation.  If I find evidence of serial correlation, then it 
would suggest a first-difference approach rather than a student fixed effects approach to 
modeling unobserved student heterogeneity.  I report the results of the serial correlation 
tests in the text. 
After running the models reported in columns 1-6 of Table 5, I select a preferred 
model that I use in the subsequent analyses.  I choose the model based upon the following 
criteria: 
1. Tests of the joint significance of added variables and their contribution to the 
model fit. 
2. When correlations of the estimated teacher effects from two or more models 
are high, I prefer the more parsimonious model. 
3. Maximizing the number of students and teachers that can be included in the 
model. 
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Based upon these criteria, I choose a preferred model of student heterogeneity that I use 
as the preferred model upon to add ways to account for classroom heterogeneity. 
Accounting for Classroom Heterogeneity 
As with students, classrooms of students will also differ in their influence on student 
learning.  The mechanism of the influence is primarily through peer effects (Hanushek & 
Rivkin, 2008; Hoxby, 2000; Hoxby & Weingarth, 2005).  The importance of the 
classroom heterogeneity becomes clear in thinking about estimating, for example, a fifth-
grade teacher’s effect on her students’ achievement in math in a given year.  If she has 
one class, then a fixed effect for the class and a fixed effect for the teacher would pick up 
the same variation.  They would be perfectly collinear. 
It is easy enough to include classroom-level covariates on the right-hand-side of the 
teacher effect estimator.  Most often these covariates are peer means.  It is worth noting, 
however, that one issue complicating what would seem to be a straight-forward 
calculation is identifying the actual class.  For example, using CMS data, I cannot 
reconstruct a class prior to 2007.  Students could be with the same teacher at the same 
time but under different course names, e.g., a special education child might have a special 
education code and be in the same classroom.  Section numbers were calibrated to the 
course code not to a physical location.  The problem, of course, is that this is not 
modeling the student’s production function precisely, but rather approximates it.  In this 
study, I estimate the preferred model from Table 5 with classroom means, and I report the 
results in column 2 of Table 6. 
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Accounting for School Heterogeneity 
There is consensus in the value-added literature that the majority of variation in 
teacher effectiveness is within rather than between schools (Aaronson, Barrow, & Sander, 
2007; Goldhaber & Brewer, 1997).  Even so, a nontrivial amount of the variation in 
teacher effects is across schools. It is difficult to isolate the teacher’s effect from the 
school’s on student achievement.  Unless the district conditions its prediction of a 
student’s achievement on the student’s enrollment in this school, it is likely to conflate 
the effect of the program with the teacher’s effect.  One can easily imagine a number of 
observable and unobservable characteristics of the school—a new reading program or 
dynamic principal—that could similarly add noise to the estimate of the teacher’s effect. 
Researchers commonly respond to this issue of school heterogeneity by including 
either school level covariates (often peer means) or school fixed effects.  Both approaches 
have the effect of constraining the comparison group for a given teacher to teachers in 
similar settings.  Taking the more extreme case of school fixed effects, by removing the 
variation in student achievement associated with attending a specific school, the district 
constrains the estimate of the teacher’s effectiveness to a comparison with other teachers 
in that school.  Although this approach is likely to remove more noise from the estimate 
of the teacher’s effectiveness, it also restricts the district’s policy uses of the data.  For 
example, it does not allow the district to measure the distribution of teacher effectiveness 
across schools.  As a result, any attempt to compensate teachers for their performance on 
this metric would have to be within a school (e.g., the top 10% of teachers in each school 
will get a bonus).  So there is a tradeoff for the district—does the benefit of reducing the 
noise in the teacher effect estimate outweigh the costs of restricting the use of the 
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estimate?  I attempt to explore the magnitude of the tradeoff by estimating models with 
and without school fixed effects (see columns 3-4 in Table 6), comparing, as before, the 
contributions of the school fixed effects to the model fit and the correlations of estimates 
under models with and without school fixed effects. 
Modeling Teacher Effects 
Once I develop a preferred model of student achievement that includes prior scores, 
student characteristics, classroom characteristics and school characteristics, I turn to 
estimating the teacher effects.  In this section, I consider three issues regarding the 
teacher effect estimators: (1) fixed or random teacher effects, (2) adjusting the effects for 
sampling error, and (3) classroom-level shocks. 
Form of Teacher Effects 
Districts must decide whether to estimate the teacher effects as fixed or random.  
In much of the literature, the effects are estimated as fixed, but some estimate them as 
random (see Table 2).  Only Harris and Sass (2006) discuss the methodological 
considerations of the choice.  The assumption of the random effect approach is that the 
random teacher effects will be uncorrelated with the student, class and school 
characteristics that condition the expectation of a student’s change in test scores.  On the 
surface, this assumption seems untenable.  There is strong evidence of sorting of teachers 
to students on observables (Bonesronning, Falch, & Strom, 2005; Boyd, Lankford, Loeb, 
& Wyckoff, 2005; Clotfelter, et al., 2005; Clotfelter, et al., 2006). 
Given the implausibility of the assumption, why would a district consider 
estimating teacher effects as random?  The advantage to the district is twofold: (1) the 
estimated effects are already shrunken by the sampling error and thus require no post-hoc 
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transformation of the effects, and (2) the random effects allow the district a 
straightforward way to estimate effects for every teacher in the sample, i.e., the random 
procedure does not require a hold-out teacher (Mihaly, McCaffrey, Lockwood, & Sass, 
2010).  This simplifies the interpretation of the estimates for the district ( i.e., a mean of 
zero is the average for the average teacher, not the hold-out teacher). 
Adjusting for Sampling Error 
As a set of estimates, the variation in teacher effects will include both estimation 
and sampling error.  Standardized test scores can be noisy measures of achievement for 
individual students. The student may not be feeling well on a given test day and perform 
poorly.  Or the student may have been lucky; the test covered items, such as a reading 
passage, that happened to sync with the students’ own interests.  The noise can result 
from classroom sources as well.  The axiomatic “dog barking outside the classroom” or 
an air-conditioning unit that malfunctions on the day of the test are both examples of 
classroom-level shocks that could introduce noise to a student’s test score.  
The level of noise in individual students’ test scores poses a threat to the validity 
of inferences about the effectiveness of teachers or schools in raising those scores.  How 
much signal can a district wring from noisy student test scores?  To the extent that this 
noise is random, one strategy is to assume that as student scores are aggregated across a 
teacher’s class, the errors would wash out.  One way to see this is to examine the 
relationship between the number of student contributing to a teacher effects and the 
variation of those teacher effects.   In one of the canonical papers on the influence of 
sampling variation on accountability systems, Kane and Staiger (2002) show that schools 
in North Carolina with smaller numbers of students have effectiveness estimates at the 
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extremes of the distribution.  The magnitude of the estimates depends in part on the 
number of observations attributable to the teacher or school.   
A common way to deal with both sources of error is through empirical Bayes or 
“shrinkage” estimators.  The idea follows the logic prevalent in the multilevel model 
random effects literature (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008; Snijders & Bosker, 1999; 
West, Welch, & Galecki, 2007) in which you partition the residual variation from a 
student level regression of the current test score on prior year test scores and any 
covariates into those student, class and teacher level error. The shrinkage estimator 
multiplies the teacher effect by an estimate of its reliability as measured by the ratio of 
the signal of the teacher effect to the signal plus the noise.  Thus estimates that have high 
amounts of noise are shrunken towards the population mean.  In the literature, these 
empirical Bayes estimates are estimated primarily in two different ways. 
The most common way is to estimate the teacher effects as fixed effects and then 
to apply a post-hoc shrinkage procedure (Harris & Sass, 2006; Kane & Staiger, 2008; 
Koedel & Betts, 2007).  In this procedure, the author reports both unadjusted and 
adjusted variations of the teacher effects.  The unadjusted are just the variation in the 
teacher effects.  The adjusted variation of teacher effects is unadjusted variation of the 
teacher effects minus the sampling error.  Typically, the literature uses the mean of the 
squared standard error of the teacher effects as the estimate of the sampling error. 
Another way to generate the empirical Bayes estimates is to estimate them 
directly through a procedure such as Stata’s –xtmixed— program.  Here the estimates of 
the teacher effects are not estimated directly, but rather as predictions of the random 
effect that have been pre-shrunk.  From a district’s perspective, the key tradeoff is that 
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estimates of the teacher effect can take substantially longer to complete since they are 
maximum likelihood estimates.   
In this study, I estimate the proportion of the unadjusted variation in teacher 
effects that is attributable to sampling error and compare the resulting distributions of 
teacher effects from three specifications: (1) unadjusted from a teacher fixed effects 
approach, (2) the same, but adjusted using the procedure above for the adjustment, and 
(3) teacher random effects.  I report the resulting distributions in columns 1-3 of Table 7. 
I graph the kernel density plots of the distribution of the effects in Figure 3.  Finally, in 
Figure 4 I plot boxplots of the range of teacher effects by the number of students 
contributing to the estimated teacher effects as an attempt to gauge the sensitivity of the 
estimates to the number of students both for adjusted and unadjusted variations.  
Classroom Shocks 
A final consideration in estimating the teacher effects is the extent to which they 
may be confounded with unobservable classroom characteristics.  Recall that even if one 
controls for classroom observables, you might still confound teacher and classroom 
effects if you have only one year of data for a teacher.  A teacher might have had a 
particularly good match with the class in that year, or there might have been a classroom 
level shock.  One way to handle this is to estimate multiple classes (in the case of 
elementary schools, this will be mean multiple years) and treat the classroom effect as a 
teacher-by-year effect nested within the teacher (Kane & Staiger, 2008; Rivkin, et al., 
2005).    
In this study, I test for the presence of a classroom level unobservable effect that 
is distinct from the teacher effect and report the results in column 4 of Table 7.  I estimate 
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the preferred model that emerges from the previous sections with and without the 
teacher-by-class effect.  I use likelihood ratio tests to determine if the inclusion of this 
effect improves the fit of the model and the correlations of the teacher effects to test the 
practical significance of the difference. 
TESTING THE PREFERRED MODEL 
In this section of the study, I transition from comparing models on a number in terms 
of the specifications used to identify teacher effects to assessing threats to the validity 
that are common to all models.  I examine: (1) the assumption that the prior test scores 
capture prior inputs to the student’s production function, (2) the potential for ceilings and 
floors in the test score instrument to bias estimates of teacher effects  and (3) the ways in 
which sorting of students across teachers within and between schools could bias teacher 
effect estimates. 
Prior Inputs 
A primary assumption of including the student score from t-1 is that it captures all 
prior inputs to the student’s education production function.  This assumption can be 
written as:  
 , 1 , 1, ,... , , , ,  for all 2,...,ijt ijt ij t ijT i ijt ijt ij tE A c E A A t T        X X X X  (13) 
where X is the matrix of student inputs. 
This assumption can be tested easily. I estimate the preferred model and test for 
whether the coefficients on the twice lagged inputs are jointly zero.  If so, there is 
empirical support for the assumption that the lagged score has captured the impact of the 
prior inputs. 
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Harris and Sass (2006, see Table 2) conduct a similar test and find no evidence of an 
impact for the prior inputs when the prior year score is included.   As a sensitivity test, I 
add the student’s score from t-2 and again test the joint significance of the prior inputs.  I 
report the results in Table 9.   
Ceiling Effects 
One criticism of value-added models is that they will likely bias downward the 
effects of teachers who instruct students who are already at the high end of the 
distribution.  The argument is that these students do not have “as far to grow” as those 
who are at lower ends of the distribution. 
There are at least three threats to the validity of teacher effects for teachers whose 
students have scored at the high end of the distribution in the previous year.  First, these 
teachers may focus on content that goes beyond the standard course of study and thus 
beyond the scale of scores.  To the extent that these teachers’ added value occurs beyond 
the range of knowledge assessed by the testing instrument, then these teacher effects will 
be biased downward.  Koedel and Betts refer to this as a “lost information” problem 
(2009b, p. 7).  This threat to the validity will not be addressed in this study.  It is a 
question of the scope of the standard course of study. 
The second threat to the validity concerns the assumption of interval scaling:  a one-
unit movement along the distribution of scores reflects the same magnitude of change in 
student achievement throughout the entire distribution.  If this assumption does not hold, 
then equally effective teachers could have different value-added scores depending upon 
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their students’ scores in the previous year. For the purposes of this study, I assume 
interval scaling of the test score distribution. 
  A third and related threat to the validity is a function of the range of scores 
possible on the test.  Students who scored high on the test in the previous year do not 
have as much “room to grow” as their peers and thus the potential value-added of their 
teachers is truncated or biased downward ” (2009b, p. 7).  The hypothesis is that if the 
teacher had a concentration of students whose previous year scores were at the top end of 
the distribution, then the teacher’s effect would be biased downward.  As Koedel and 
Betts point out, this hypothesis cannot be tested by examining the correlation between the 
previous year’s score and the gains from that year because the presence of regression to 
the mean will induce a negative correlation.  Prior scores are negatively correlated with 
gains.  Nor can this hypothesis be tested by examining the correlation between prior 
scores and the teacher’s current-year value-added estimate on the assumption that a 
negative correlation would be evidence of a ceiling effect bias.  One could find little to no 
evidence of correlation but this would assume that teacher effectiveness is not sorted a 
priori by student ability. 
There has been relatively little work done on the potential for ceiling effects to 
bias value-added estimates.  Koedel and Betts (2009b) conduct simulations in which they 
right-censor the distribution of scores at various points and then test the effect of those 
ceilings on teachers’ value-added estimates.  They find that their estimates of teacher 
effects are robust to changes in the ceiling as they move it down to the 75
th
 percentile (a 
skewness of -0.64).  The correlations of teacher effects with a 75
th
 percentile ceiling are 
correlated at 0.94 with the teacher effect estimates under no ceiling. 
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I cannot directly test the hypothesis that ceiling effects bias the estimates of 
teacher effects in the sample.  However, following the empirical strategy of Koedel and 
Betts (2009b), I can explore the potential for bias given the distribution of student scores 
across teachers.   First, I use kernel density plots of the actual and lagged scale scores for 
math in grades 5-8 to illustrate the extent to which the distribution of scores is negatively 
skewed in a way that might produce ceiling effects in the test.  Second, following Koedel 
and Betts (2007), I divide students into deciles by their scores at t-2 and plot their average 
gains from t-1 to t.  Smaller average gains in the upper tail of the distribution could 
indicate the presence of ceiling effects. 
Third, I plot the value-added of teachers with by the percentage of their students 
in to the top and bottom 10% of the student distribution of scores at t-1.  Smaller 
variation in the teacher effects for teachers with high proportions of previously high-
achieving students could indicate that the test instrument is not picking up the full range 
of these teachers’ contribution to their students’ achievement.   
Fourth, I analyze the proportion of students whose maximum gain on the test from 
t-1 to t will be smaller than the maximum teacher effect in that year.  The intuition is that 
teachers with high concentrations of students at the top of the range could be at a 
disadvantage if the top teacher effect would be unattainable for them given their students.   
For example, suppose that a teacher at the 95
th
 percentile of the effectiveness distribution 
improved their students’ scores 0.4 standard deviations, or roughly 4 scale score points 
more than the average teacher.    It is conceivable that an effect of this size could be 
impossible given the teacher’s students’ prior year scores.   
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Fifth, as a test of the effect of students at the high end of the distribution of scores 
from t-1 on the teacher effects, I re-estimate the base model with samples trimmed at the 
99
th
, 95
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles of the distribution.  I identify how many teachers are 
excluded from the calculation under each trimmed sample and the correlation of the 
effects from those that remain. 
Finally, following a suggestion from Tim Sass (2010), I estimate the preferred 
model but with test scores in the current year normalized by the mean and standard 
deviation of the decile of the student’s prior year score.  The intuition behind this test is 
that the coefficients on the lagged score could vary by the position of the prior score’s 
position in the distribution.  By normalizing based upon the prior score, I would be 
modeling more flexibly the relationship between the prior score and the current score, 
perhaps even more so than including quadratic and cubic forms of the prior test (for an 
example of this technique, see LoGerfo, Nichols, & Reardon, 2006; Reardon, 2008).  I 
compare the teacher effects estimated teacher effects from this model with those of the 
preferred model as a sensitivity test for the effect of the test score. 
The potential for ceiling effects in test scores to bias estimates of teacher 
effectiveness depend largely on the extent of student sorting across teachers.  In the next 
section, I outline how will I test the potential of such sorting to bias estimates of all 
teachers, not just those whose students scored at the top of the distribution in the prior 
year. 
Sorting 
The issue of sorting of teachers to students both across and within schools poses 
significant risks to inference about the effectiveness of teachers.    It may be useful to 
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observe these mechanisms through a measurement error framework—this time not in 
terms of the students’ test scores, but rather in terms of the teacher’s estimates.   In this 
light, teacher effects are a function of their true effectiveness and an error component.  
We can never observe true effectiveness for it is always manifested in the context of 
confounding factors such as the characteristics of the students, classrooms and schools in 
which teachers demonstrate their effectiveness.   
One approach to identifying the true effectiveness in the midst of sorting of teachers 
to students is to follow the strategy outlined above in the derivation of the preferred 
model where I control for sorting by conditioning teacher effects on observable student, 
classroom, and school characteristics.  The presupposition of this approach is that true 
teacher effectiveness is distributed randomly across students conditional on the included 
characteristics.   Hence, controlling for differences in students, classrooms and schools 
will reduce bias to the extent that these conditions influence the observed effects  of 
teachers whose true effectiveness is not sorted across these student, classroom and school 
characteristics.  This is the approach adopted in this study, and the sensitivity tests 
proposed in this section follow accordingly. 
Yet before I proceed to the sensitivity tests, I want to note that it could also be the 
case that true teacher effectiveness is not distributed randomly across students.  In this 
case, controlling for the student, classroom and school heterogeneity could conceivably 
bias the teacher effects.  For example, suppose that truly highly effective teachers sorted 
themselves to schools with affluent children.  In this case, true teacher effectiveness 
would be positively correlated with a school’s socioeconomic status.  By controlling for 
the school characteristics, I would bias downward the effectiveness of these teachers.    
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Because it cannot observe true teacher effectiveness, the district cannot assess the 
extent to which true teacher effectiveness is sorted across schools.  However, the district 
can assess the benefits and costs of controlling for the student, classroom and school 
heterogeneity.   Resuming the scenario above, suppose that the district’s most effective 
teachers (true, not observed) sorted to affluent schools, and by controlling for the 
attributes of these schools in its value-added model, the district was in fact biasing 
downward these teachers’ observed effect estimates to an undetermined extent.  In the 
context of a pay for performance system, these teachers are already receiving non-
pecuniary awards for being in these schools (e.g., increased parental involvement, less 
discipline problems, strong PTA support).  There are already incentives now for these 
teachers to cluster to these schools.  Even if the value-added model provided a slight 
disincentive to be at these schools, the district would need to decide if this is worse than 
the status quo in terms of increasing the probability that low-performing students in high-
poverty schools have access to the most effective teachers?  
Both across and within school sorting of teachers to students can threaten the validity 
of the value-added estimates.  There is an extensive literature on the sorting of teachers 
across schools (Boyd, et al., 2005; Clotfelter & et al., 2004; Clotfelter, et al., 2005).  
Although there is less on the sorting of teachers to students within schools, the political 
science literature would suggest that within school assignment of teachers to students 
may be a principal’s way of meting out rewards to favored teachers (Wilson, 1989). In 
fact, this type of sorting could be exacerbated by a compensation system which limits 
differential rewards based upon effectiveness among teachers.  For example, in CMS, 
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novice teachers are disproportionately assigned previously lower-performing student both 
across and within schools (Center for Educational Policy Research, 2010).   
If this sorting occurred only on the basis of observable characteristics of the student, 
then the inclusion of these characteristics in the model to estimate teacher effects should 
mitigate the threat to validity of these estimates.  However, if the sorting occurs on 
unobservable characteristics, then the threat is more pernicious.  The threat of this type of 
sorting stems largely from the endogeneity of the student’s inputs at time t to the 
student’s unobserved endowment.  For example, if the student’s parents lobby for a 
particular teacher assignment and the human capital underlying the lobbying also predicts 
the student’s score under that preferred teacher, then the estimate of that teacher’s effect 
will be inconsistent.   
One can imagine two types of within-school sorting of students to teachers.  The 
first, and perhaps relatively easier one to account for, is that based on time-invariant 
student characteristics.   If this were the case, then a model including student fixed effects 
should account for this sort of tracking.  For example, this would remove the correlation 
between a student’s assignment and the student’s unobserved endowment.  For the 
student fixed effect to mitigate the endogeneity created by the parental lobbying for the 
student’s assignment, one would have to assume that this lobbying was constant across 
years.  Or, as Rothstein (2009) notes, it would be, at least in terms of the student’s 
unobserved characteristics, as if all decisions based on the child’s placement were made 
at the beginning of the kindergarten and never changed throughout the student’s 
education. 
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However, it seems equally likely that student assignment to teachers could result from 
dynamic rather than static processes.  For example, consider the recent controversy 
around the publication of value-added estimates for teachers in the Los Angeles Unified 
School District by The Los Angeles Times (Song, Felch, & Smith, 2010).   Might astute 
parents in Los Angeles examine the value-added estimates for their children’s 
prospective teachers and then lobby the principals for assignment to these teachers?  To 
the extent that the principals respond to this pressure, then the assignment is likely to be 
endogenous. 
Rothstein (2009, 2010) proposes a simple falsification test for the presence of 
student sorting suggested by Todd and Wolpin (2003). He estimates the effects of 5th 
grade teachers in North Carolina on the 4th grade gains of their students.  He finds almost 
as much variation in the effects of the 5
th
 grade teachers as the student’s 4
th
 grade teacher 
although of course, at that point in time the 5
th
 grade teachers had never taught the 4
th
 
grade students.  Koedel and Betts (2009a) were able to replicate Rothstein’s results on 
their own sample of students from San Diego.  Both use the ratio of the variation of the 
effect of future teachers to the effect of current teachers as a measure of the size of the 
bias. 
Nevertheless Rothstein’s critique has left many researchers unconvinced 
(Hanushek & Rivkin, 2009).  Suppose a class of 4th grade students has a highly effective 
teacher and as a result their test scores rise.  Now suppose that their school sorts students 
based on their test scores at the end of the year.  These students will be assigned to a 
certain fifth grade teacher because they had such gains in fourth grade.  If one conducts 
Rothstein’s falsification test and estimates the effect of the 5th grade teachers on the 4
th
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grade gains, there will likely be a correlation that is induced by the sorting.  After 
replicating Rothstein’s findings, Koedel and Betts (2009a) conduct sensitivity tests and 
conclude that including multiple years of data for a teacher reduces the bias from the 
sorting significantly in all models and completely in the student fixed effect specification. 
In this study, I estimate the extent of sorting of students to teachers across schools 
and the extent it biases estimates of teacher effects.  First a I plot the means and standard 
deviations of the student scores from t-1 by classroom under three conditions:  the actual 
sorting in the data, a simulation of random sorting within school year and grade, and a 
simulation of perfect sorting under the same strata.  Comparing the means and standard 
deviations across these scenarios is one gauge of the extent of sorting. 
Then, following an approach adopted by a several recent studies (Aaronson, et al., 
2007; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2009; Koedel & Betts, 2009a), I identify classrooms that seem 
to approximate random assignment on observables.  The strategy is to identify a subset of 
classes for which I cannot reject the null hypothesis of no sorting on observables.   First, I 
regress the student test at t-1 on a vector of indicators for class assignments in each 
school at t.  Then, I test the hypothesis that the classroom indicators are jointly 
significant.  Schools in which I fail to reject the null hypothesis will be placed into a 
sample of schools with random assignment on observables.  Then, I rerun the basic 
specification on this restricted sample.  The change in the variation of teacher effects in 
the restricted sample is an estimate of the effect of sorting.   
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
Estimates of teacher value-added are not so interesting in and of themselves, but 
rather in the context of district policy.    Many districts are interested in use of these 
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estimates as one component of compensation reform (Podgursky & Springer, 2007; 
Springer, 2010).  Others will be interested in using the data as a way of increasing the 
probability that low-performing students will receive high value-added teachers.  For 
example, one could imagine a scenario where a district ceased to monitor the equitable 
distribution of inputs to the education production function that have trivial effects on 
student achievement (e.g., the number of VCRs in a building) and turned instead to 
monitoring the impacts of inputs such as high value-added teachers. 
In this section, I explore two such policy issues.  First, I assess the potential uses of 
value-added data to inform district policies of distributing teachers to students.  Second, I 
evaluate the extent to which districts can reliably compare the value-added estimates of 
teachers for use in personnel decisions.     
Distributing Teachers to Students 
In this study, I explore the sorting of effective and ineffective teachers to students.  
Effective and ineffective teachers can be sorted to students across and/or within schools.  
If teacher effectiveness is primarily sorted across schools, then the district will likely try 
to incentivize effective teachers to switch schools to even out the distribution, assuming 
that the teacher’s effectiveness is transferable.  If teacher effectiveness is primarily sorted 
within schools, then the district can focus less on movement of teachers and more on 
matching teachers to students within those schools. 
First, I use a variation decomposition approach to estimate the magnitude of the 
variation in teacher effectiveness within and between schools.  I estimate the preferred 
model for math scores for grades 5-8 in 2010 with and without school fixed effects.  The 
proportion of the variation in the teacher effects that remains after the inclusion of the 
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school fixed effects is an estimate of the within-school variation.  To show this 
graphically, I overlay kernel density plots of the distribution of teacher effects across and 
within schools. As a way to depict the across-school variation, I plot the range of teacher 
effects within each school in the district. 
Once I establish the extent of across and within school variation in teacher 
effectiveness, I turn to estimating the extent to which these effective and ineffective 
teachers are distributed to specific types of students both across and within schools. To 
test the presence of the sorting, I divide students in grades 3-7 in 2009 into by-grade 
quartiles of achievement in 2009.  Then, I estimate the across and within-school 
probabilities that these students are assigned in 2010 to teachers whose value-added as of 
2009 was in the top 25% or bottom 25% of the district.   
The sorting of teachers suggests that subject to the dynamics of the teacher labor 
market, a superintendent could assign or incent more effective teachers to move to 
schools with lower concentrations of effective teachers.  There is evidence to suggest that 
teacher effectiveness is portable and not school-specific (Lockwood & McCaffrey, 2009; 
Sanders, Wright, & Langevin, 2010).  If this were the case, moving the effective teachers 
to schools with less effective teachers could increase student achievement for those 
students in the receiving schools but could decrease the student achievement for those 
students in the schools from which the effective teachers are moved.  The predicted 
general equilibrium benefits of this sort of policy would depend, in part, upon (1) the 
effectiveness of the teachers who replaced the transferring teachers, (2) whether effective 
teachers are effective across different student sub-types, and (3) whether different sub-
types of students are equally responsive to an effective teacher.  If a low-performing 
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student benefits more from a highly effective teacher than a high-performing student, 
then one can imagine a scenario in which from a social welfare perspective, there is a net 
gain in student achievement.  For example, the gains in student achievement for lower-
performing students from having a top 25% teacher could be greater than the losses in 
student achievement from higher-performing students who move from having a top 25% 
to having an average teacher. 
To investigate this possibility, I adapt an analysis from Aaronson, Barrow, and 
Sander (2007).  I use the same groupings of students in grades 3-7 in 2009 as above and 
calculate the mean gains in their test scores from 2009 to 2010.  Then I estimate teacher 
effects from the preferred model and report the standard deviation of the teacher effect in 
student level standard deviations.  If I divide this standard deviation by the average gain 
for the group, I have an estimate of the proportion of average gain that is attributable to 
the teacher effects.  If lower performing students are benefiting more from higher value-
added teachers then there are possibilities that their gains could offset the losses from 
other students who are losing their better teachers.  
Personnel Decisions  
In addition to using value-added estimates to inform its policies of distributing 
teachers to students, a district may want to use the estimates as a measure of teacher 
performance in the context of evaluation, compensation and retention policies.  The 
degree of stability of the estimates across time will inform the degree to which they can 
be used for personnel decisions. 
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Following much recent work (Aaronson, et al., 2007; Jacob, et al., 2008; McCaffrey, 
Sass, Lockwood, & Mihaly, 2009), I partition the variation in teacher effects from the 
preferred model into three parts  
 2 2 2
,where
var( ) , var( ) , and var( )
kt k kt kt
k kt kt ktse
   
    
  
  
 (15) 
where k is the part of the teacher’s effect that is persistent across time, kt  is the part of 
the teacher’s effect that is specific to year t, and kt  is the sampling error.  Then, 
2
becomes the variation in the persistent part of teacher effectiveness (i.e., the between-
teacher variation) and can be estimated as the correlation of teacher effects across time; 
2 is the variation within teachers over time (i.e., the within-teacher variation); and 
2
ktse is 
variation in the sampling error which can be given by the mean squared error of the 
standard errors of the teacher effects. 
Under this decomposition, I estimate the reliability of the teacher effect estimate 
(i.e., ratio of signal to noise) as: 
 
2 2
2 2 2
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 (16) 
The reliability of the estimate is another way of thinking of the shrinkage factor in the 
empirical Bayes approach to shrinkage.  It is that proportion of the variation in teacher 
effects that is not due to random or sampling error.  The stability of the estimate is the 
proportion of the variation that is attributed to the time-persistent component of teacher 
effectiveness.  It can be given as: 
 
2
2 2 2
Stability=
ktse

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 (17) 
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From here, I estimate the between-teacher variation as  
 
2
2 2
Between Teacher
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

 (18) 
and the within-teacher component as: 
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2 2
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
 (19) 
The district could be interested in the latter two estimates as a way of informing its 
resource allocation between, for example, recruitment/deselection and professional 
development.  For instance, if the proportion of within-teacher variation is low relative to 
that between teachers, then it could suggest that the professional development activities 
may have less return than recruiting and tenure policies.     
The degree to which these measures of teacher effectiveness are consistent for a 
specific teacher over time is likely to influence the buy-in from the teacher and the 
measure’s overall usefulness a policy tool.  On the one hand, if the estimates are not 
sufficiently stable, then it is unlikely that the teachers and principals will see much of a 
signal in them and any use of the measures in an incentive capacity is likely to be 
undermined.  On the other hand, if the measures are not sufficiently nimble or malleable, 
then it is likely that they will not pick up on changes in the effectiveness that stem from 
the teacher’s effort to improve. This, too, would diminish the signal. 
In this study, I follow the literature in assessing the stability of the estimates through 
(a) the correlation of the point estimates of teacher effectiveness and (b) transition 
matrices that record the quantile of a teacher’s effectiveness in two successive time 
periods.  I run two sets of analyses—one on the whole sample of teachers in the district 
and the other on a restricted sample of only those teachers present in the district in both 
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time periods.  The former is likely to be the more policy relevant to the district—it is 
what the teachers will see about their performance.  The latter deals with selection and 
attrition dynamics that can add noise to the estimated correlation.  For example, a given 
teacher’s performance could look like it varies more than it does if the overall average 
teacher performance in the district is changing, i.e., the reference group changes  
The pursuit of value-added estimates of teacher effectiveness is motivated by 
districts that seek to distinguish among their teachers’ effect on student achievement for 
reasons as varied as professional development to compensation.  Because much of the 
concern in the literature on value-added models of teacher effectiveness has been in 
estimating the variation in teacher effectiveness rather than the estimation of individual 
teacher effects, the issue of how districts should handle the imprecision of the effect 
estimates has been given less attention than perhaps it deserves (for a notable exception, 
see Lockwood, Louis, & McCaffrey, 2002; McCaffrey, et al., 2010).  The general 
admonition the literature is to (a) include more than one year of data for the teacher 
and/or (b) to be cautious of dividing teachers into more than three groups—a large middle 
flanked by two smaller tails (Lockwood, et al., 2002; McCaffrey, et al., 2003). 
Yet this issue requires more thought by the district. For example, in the literature, 
researchers typically construct 95% confidence intervals around the teacher effects.  
However, given the counterfactual in which a district has almost no information with 
which to distinguish teachers (Weisberg, et al., 2009), does it need to be 95% certain that 
the teacher’s effect is above or below average?  Or, how should a district balance the 
risks of committing Type I and Type II errors (McCaffrey, Han, & Lockwood, 2008)? 
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In this study, I investigate this issue in two ways.  First, I estimate teacher effects 
for fifth grade and eighth-grade math teachers and plot the effects with varying 
confidence levels around them.  I report how many teachers are significantly below or 
above the average based upon the confidence interval level. 
Second, following a suggestion by Doug Staiger (2009), I experiment with an idea of 
estimating the probability that a teacher is in a given quantile.  For example, imagine two 
teachers whose confidence intervals around their effects both cross zero, but one does just 
barely and the other straddles the line.  Assuming a normal distribution of the error 
around the point estimate, we can be more confident that the former teacher is above the 
teach mean.  In this approach, I leverage the assumption of normally distributed errors to 
estimate the probability that a teacher’s effect is above or below the teacher mean.  
LIMITATIONS
There are a number of limitations both to the study, specifically, and to the policy 
use of value-added models more generally that the methods described in this section do 
not solve. 
Limitations of the Data 
First, the teacher student matching in the data depends on what has been entered into 
the student information system.  The student information is designed to capture at most 
two teachers who share equal responsibility for a student’s instruction in a given subject. 
Consequently, if a school chooses a different instructional strategy—departmentalization 
or flexible grouping in which students are rearranged among the teachers episodically 
throughout the year—then the attribution of a single teacher to the student is likely to be 
invalid.   
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A similar concern arises with special student populations such as English language 
learners or exceptional children.  For example, English language learner populations may 
receive instruction from a homeroom teacher as well as a resource teacher.  The value-
added models estimated in this study cannot handle this type of joint production.  Rather, 
they ascribe all of the value-added to one teacher.   
Another issue is the extent to which student achievement in a given subject is jointly 
produced by several teachers in the same term across subjects (Jackson & Bruegmann, 
2009; Koedel, 2009).  For example, it is easy to imagine that the Social Studies instructor 
could influence reading achievement.  Although the data documents the course 
enrollments, the actual models do not allow for this.  The implications are that the teacher 
effect estimates could be biased.  
An additional limitation of the data lies in its provenance—hand-entered by a school-
level administrator through the interface of the student information system. (This is not 
true of the test scores, but is true of most of the other variables, especially the control 
variables.)  Sources of inaccurate data include:   
1.  The data is mis-entered. 
2. The student information system is not designed to provide archival or 
retrospective data; it is designed for snapshots.  As a result, records can be 
overwritten and this will be unobservable to the researcher.  For example, the 
CMS student information system deletes the course records from the 
scheduling data base of a student who withdraws from school. 
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3. There can be incentives for school-level staff not to record certain types of 
data (e.g., discipline incidents that will reflect negatively on the school in 
district reports). 
4. In at least the case of unexcused absences, the district allows schools to put 
students with large numbers of unexcused absences through a special 
program.  When the student completes the program, the absences are erased 
from the student’s record.  This is unobservable to the district office. 
The potential problems with some of these measures points to a tradeoff for the district.  
On the one hand, the district may want to control for student heterogeneity by using as 
many of these measures as is feasible, especially if the district decides to refrain from 
including time-invariant variables such as gender or ethnicity in its models.  Yet each 
new variable increases the risk of having right-hand-side variables measured with error. 
I have limited the scope of the study to students with no missing data.  As Table 4 
makes clear, this eliminates a number of students who are likely to be different than those 
who remain in the sample.  Although this type of constraint is most likely to affect 
individual teacher estimates, it is possible that the exclusion of the students with missing 
data could change the overall variation in teacher effects. 
Limitations of Use of Value-added Measures for Policy 
In addition to limitations posed by the data, there are limitations to the use of value-
added measures for policy.  First, the value-added methodology assumes that the tests on 
which they are based are good measures of student achievement.  A number of testing 
experts challenge this assumption (Koretz, 2002; McCaffrey, et al., 2003) or emphasize 
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how small changes in the scaling of the tests can produce substantial differences in the 
estimates for particular teachers (Ballou, 2009; Lockwood et al., 2007). 
Second, value-added estimates provide measures of effectiveness for a limited 
number of students.  Nationally, the oft-cited figure is that 69% of teachers do not teach 
in a subject or grade in which a test is administered that can be used to measure student 
achievement growth.  In CMS, that number is 60%.   Value-added covers one dimension 
of teaching for one subset of teachers in a limited number of subjects.  
The options for policymakers are twofold:  (1) add similar assessments of student 
learning in other grades and subjects and (2) use the value-added measures to learn what 
the effective and ineffective teachers are doing, taking advantage of the value-added 
measure as a validation of the effective practices.  Then extrapolate the practices to 
teachers in non-assessed areas on the assumption that the practices are not subject-
specific. 
Finally, I do not attempt in this study to test some of the fundamental assumptions of 
value-added methodology, the types of assumptions outlined by Todd and Wolpin 
(2003).  In particular, I assume that the effects of past inputs (including teachers) do not 
affect the student’s current year achievement beyond what is captured by the prior test 
score.  In addition, I also assume that the dynamic responses of students’ families to prior 
education experiences are orthogonal to the observed inputs of the student’s production 
function in a given year.  I assume that the inputs to student achievement in a given year 
are additive rather than multiplicative.  Section 4.3 outlines a number of assumptions 
required for consistent teacher effect estimates that I do not test in this study. 
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RESULTS
In this section, I summarize the results from deriving a preferred model, testing it 
against threats to its validity, and the exploring two potential policy uses. 
ARRIVING AT A PREFERRED MODEL 
Dealing with the Lagged Score 
Columns 1-4 of Table 5 report the results from four prevalent ways in the literature 
to capture observed and unobserved prior inputs to the student’s education production 
function through the use of one or more prior scores.  Column 1 summarizes the model 
described in Equation (5) which includes one prior test score as a lagged dependent (the 
Lag (1) model).  Column 2 adds another prior score from t-2 (hereafter, the Lag (2) 
model).  Column 3 summarizes the model described in Equation (8), which instruments 
for the t-1 score with one from t-2 (the IV model).  The model summarized in column 4 
moves the prior score from t-1 from the right-hand-side to the left-hand-side so that the 
dependent variable is the change in scores from t to t-1 (the gainscore model). 
Examining Table 5, the four models produce similar teacher effects.  The standard 
deviation of the teacher effects (reported in student-level standard deviations of test 
scores) are consistently between 0.19-0.21 sds when the teacher effects are unadjusted for 
sampling error and 0.15-0.17 sds when the estimates are shrunken discussed previously.  
The estimated teacher effects from the models are correlated quite highly as well with the 
Lag (1), Lag (2), and IV estimators correlated from 0.96-0.99.  Each of these is correlated 
with the noisier gainscore model at 0.84-0.86. 
The striking similarity of the results places some of the statistical concerns among 
value-added researchers in perspective for the district.  The primary justification for the 
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Lag (2) model is mitigate the effect of measurement error in the t-1 score and to allow the 
coefficient on the t-1 score to be conditional on the t-2 score rather than impose the same 
coefficient on each student.  Yet this model correlates with the Lag (1) model at 0.96.  
Similarly, the rationale for the IV approach in column 3 is to handle the endogeneity 
created by the measurement error in the prior test score being on the right-hand-side.  For 
the district, however, this approach results in almost identical teacher effects.  It is harder 
to know what to conclude from the gainscore model results in column 4.  It requires no 
additional complexity in estimation, and it remains highly correlated with the other 
models (0.84-0.86).   From a statistical perspective, the decision comes down to a trade-
off between the benefit of the gainscore model (e.g., no measurement error issues from 
having a lagged dependent variable) versus the cost of the assumption of complete decay 
of prior achievement discussed previously. 
From an implementation perspective, districts may prefer the gainscore model and 
the Lag (1).  Both are less complicated to compute than the IV model.  More importantly, 
each of these models allows the district to include more students and teachers.  Although 
the Lag (2) model results in estimates for only seven fewer teachers and 30 fewer 
classrooms over a three-year period, it results in 8,061 fewer student-by-year 
observations and eliminates 4,517 students from the estimation.  As a result the district 
could be creating an incentive for teachers to ignore these students. As seen previously in 
Figure 1, these students are likely to be lower-performing than their peers and so the 
district could exacerbate its efforts to raise the achievement of its lowest-performing 
students.  A larger issue of excluding teachers and students in the Lag (2) and IV models 
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is that in NC, no fourth-grade students and teachers can be included in the estimation 
because there is no second-grade test. 
Accounting for Student Heterogeneity 
All of the models summarized in columns (1-4) assume that the student’s prior 
score(s) also capture the effect of the student’s unobserved endowment.  Columns 5-6 of 
Table 5 go further through a student fixed effect [Equation (11)] and first difference 
approach [Equation (12)], respectively.  The first difference approach in column 6 uses 
the same dependent variables as the gainscore model in column 4 but differs in 
transforming all the left-hand side variables into first differences, including the teacher 
effect.  This means that the teacher effects it estimates are actually the difference in 
teacher effect from a student’s teacher at t-1 to the teacher at t.   
From a statistical perspective, these methods are correlated similarly less strongly 
(0.67-0.76) with the models in columns 1-4.  On the hypothesis that noisier estimates of 
teacher effects, especially in the student fixed effects specification, could result in lower 
correlations, I checked the correlations of the estimates adjusted for sampling error and 
there was little difference in the magnitude of the correlations.  In addition, both models 
seemed to decrease dramatically the impact of the time-varying student characteristics.  
Both estimators also produced teacher effects with larger unadjusted standard 
deviations of teacher effects.   The effect of adjusting for sampling error on the student 
fixed effect teacher estimates was more pronounced than the other models, which is 
consonant with the conventional wisdom in the value-added literature that the student 
fixed effects result in noisier estimates of teacher effects.  The first difference estimator is 
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the only one in which there was not an appreciable difference between the unadjusted and 
adjusted teacher effects.   
The correlations of the teacher effects from the first difference and student fixed 
effects models are moderately correlated at 0.62.  Given that the presence of serial 
correlation would indicate a preference for the first difference estimator, I conducted the 
test for serial correlation developed by Jeffrey Wooldridge and implemented using 
Stata’s –xtserial— command  (Drukker, 2003).  The F-statistic for the test of the null 
hypothesis of no first order autocorrelation was 2027.44 resulting in a strong rejection of 
the null of no first-order autocorrelation.   The implication is that the first difference 
estimator is the more appropriate estimator because the unobserved endowment will not 
be correlated with the lagged score. 
In selecting a base model to move forward in the analysis, I chose the Lag (1) model 
over the first difference model for the ease of interpretation and computation.  The first 
difference model requires estimating fixed effects for every combination of teacher from t 
and t-1 and extrapolating the teacher’s value-added at t from those combinations.  I move 
forward to look at modeling classroom and school heterogeneity with the base model 
summarized in column 1 of Table 5. 
Accounting for Classroom and School Heterogeneity 
Table 6 summarizes three models that attempt to take into account heterogeneity 
among classrooms and schools in estimating teacher effects.   Column 1 brings forward 
the base model (Table 5, column 1) for controlling for student heterogeneity.   Column 2 
adds a vector of classroom means to the model in column 1.  Column 3 adds an additional 
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vector of school-level means.  Column 4 excludes those school means and replaces them 
with school fixed effects. 
In every specification, the additional characteristics were jointly significant at 
p<.001.  The smaller F-statistics for the student controls indicate that some of the work 
being done by the student controls in the base model in column 1 was really the effect of 
the classroom and school composition (I excluded the individual student from the 
calculation of the classroom means).  Nevertheless, the additional controls did little to 
change the overall fit of the model, consistently explaining 77% of the variation in 
student test scores.  Nor did the presence of the classroom (column 2) and school 
covariates (column 3) change significantly the estimated teacher effects; they remained 
highly correlated at 0.96 and 0.89, respectively.  The correlations in the school fixed 
effects models were significantly lower.  This is to be expected, however, as this becomes 
the correlation of a teacher’s effect relative to the district’s teachers to the effect relative 
to other teachers in the teacher’s school. 
Although the correlations across the models were large, it may not be enough for the 
district to conclude that it is indifferent among the models.  Even with the high 
correlations, it is possible that the teachers whose ratings moved significantly between 
the models could share characteristics that the district will need to heed from a policy 
perspective.  A district would likely want to explore the cases of outlier individual 
teachers whose scores changed significantly between the models to identify patterns that 
could require a policy decision. 
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Modeling Teacher Effects 
Up to this point, I have estimated the teacher effects as fixed effects pooled across all 
the teacher’s classes.  As discussed in Section 4.3.5, most researchers adjust these fixed 
effects estimates to account for the sampling variation and/or across-year or class 
variation in the effects.  Table 7 compares the effects of two types of shrinkage on the 
distribution of teacher effects.  Columns 1-2 are the unadjusted and shrunken standard 
deviations of teacher effects from the preferred model summarized in column 3 of Table 
6.  The estimates are shrunken by the procedure outlined previously.  Column 3 replicates 
the model in column 2 but estimates the teacher effects as random effects rather than 
fixed.  An assumption of the random effect estimator is that the random teacher effects 
are orthogonal to the inputs.  In the teacher fixed estimates, there is evidence that this 
assumption is violated; the correlation between the teacher fixed effects and the left-
hand-side variables is 0.11.  Nevertheless, the teacher effects from these two estimators 
are correlated at 0.98.   
Column 4 adds a classroom random effect to the model in column 3.  Here, the 
classroom random effect is nested within the teacher random effect.  In the case of 
teachers with only one class per year, the classroom random effect is equivalent to a 
teacher-by-year effect.  Whether the teacher has one or many classes per year, the intent 
of the classroom random effect is to account for non-persistent variation at the classroom 
level—perhaps due to an especially good or poor match of the teacher and students in 
that specific class or perhaps a classroom-level shock out from the teacher’s effect—from 
the teacher’s persistent effect.  In this case, including the classroom random effect 
reduces the variation in teacher-level effects slightly and a likelihood ratio test provides 
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evidence that the inclusion of the classroom random effects improves the model fit.  The 
correlation between the models with and without the classroom effects is strong.  Figure 
3 shows the effect of the shrinkage estimators on the distribution of teacher effects.  As 
expected, shrinking the teacher effects (column 2 vs. column 1) narrows the distribution 
of teacher effects.  Including the classroom random effects tightens the distribution still 
further.   
A district faces a trade-off in deciding whether or not to shrink the estimates.  On the 
one hand, the shrinkage estimators pull towards the mean teachers at the tails that might 
be their due to sampling variation.  Figure 4 shows the sensitivity of the magnitude of 
teacher effects to the numbers of student attributed to the teacher across all years in the 
sample.  Comparing Panels A-B, it is clear that the shrinkage estimators affect teachers 
with fewer numbers of students.  These teachers could be novice teachers, elementary 
school teachers, or teachers in schools with smaller class sizes (e.g., a Title 1 school).  By 
using a shrinkage estimator, the district could potentially underestimate the effect of a 
highly talented novice teacher or overestimate the effect of another teacher who is 
teaching a small number of students, in both cases by pulling the teacher toward the 
middle.  In some ways, the district must decide whether it prefers avoiding a Type I error 
by choosing a shrinkage estimator versus a Type II error in which it fails to recognize a 
truly good or poor teacher.   
 The district faces a similar trade-off in deciding whether or not to include the 
classroom random effects.  Choosing to include them helps buffer teachers from 
classroom-level shocks that could idiosyncratically change their effects (e.g., a 
problematic student that the teacher spends extraordinary amounts of time with.)  
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However, especially for teachers with only one class per year, using the classroom 
random effects could attenuate the true improvement of the teacher.  For example, a 
portion of a second-year elementary school teacher’s improvement will look like a 
classroom level shock and be partially netted out of the teacher effect.  For teachers who 
are accustomed to quick changes year-to-year, this smoothing out of the effect could be 
frustrating. 
 In the end, I chose the model summarized in column 4 of Table 7 as the base 
model to be used throughout the rest of the dissertation.  As the results in Table 7 
demonstrate, there is no clear winner among the models there.  They are all highly 
correlated.  The advantages to the district of the teacher and class random effect model 
are the elimination for the need for post-estimation shrinkage of the teacher effects and 
the intuitive appeal of sweeping out non-persistent variation in a teacher’s effect (i.e., the 
classroom random effect) which should lead to greater stability of the estimates. 
Including Race Covariates 
For many districts, the decision about whether to include the race of the student 
and/or the racial composition of the classroom and school is fraught with political 
implications.  Many worry that including the race covariates is tantamount to having 
different expectations for students based upon their race.  To test the effect of race 
covariates on the teacher effects from the preferred model, I estimate three additional 
variants that include student, classroom and school race covariates.  Table 8 reports the 
results.  Including race covariates did not seem to have an impact on results from the base 
model.  It did not change the distribution of the teacher or classroom level effects.  It does 
not reduce the student-level error.  The teacher effects from the various models were 
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correlated at no less than 0.988 with the base model.  Likelihood ratio tests did indicate 
that the model fit improves with the presence of student and school-level race covariates.  
Classroom racial covariates were not statistically significant in any of the specifications.  
The results indicate an approach that districts may adopt to help mitigate potential 
conflicts over the inclusion of certain covariates:  test for their effect before having a 
longer philosophical debate about their inclusion. 
TESTING THE PREFERRED MODEL 
With the preferred model established, I proceeded to test it for three particular threats 
to its validity—prior inputs to the education production function, ceiling effects in the test 
instrument and sorting of teachers to students.  I am assuming that the analysis completed 
in this section would apply equally well to the other models considered in the preceding 
section.  However, I do not test this assumption on the other models. 
Testing the Prior Score Assumption 
Before moving to testing the preferred model against two primary threats to its 
validity, I test the assumption that the student’s prior score captures the effects of all prior 
educational inputs.  The primary assumption behind the preferred model is that the prior 
score captures the impact of previous inputs to the student’s educational production 
function. Table 9 summarizes tests of this assumption. To test the assumption that the 
score at t-1 captures all previous inputs from t-1 and t-2, I estimated the Lag (1) model 
and included classroom and school means of variables from t-1 and t-2.  Wald tests of the 
joint significance of the t-2 variables provide strong evidence that observed 
characteristics at t-2 of the student predict the student scores at t conditional on the score 
and inputs from t-1.  There is weaker evidence that the school characteristics from t-2 
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affect the score at t, but they are statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level.   A 
likelihood ratio test suggests that including the t-2 inputs improves the fit of the baseline 
model. 
 I also tested the effect on inputs from t-2 of adding the t-2 score on the left-hand-
side (column 3).  The student, classroom and school inputs from t-2 remain statistically 
significant, and a likelihood ratio test provides evidence that this model fits the data 
better than the Lag (1) model.  So in either case, the assumption that the score at t-1 
and/or t-2 captures the effect of prior inputs appears to be violated.  To test the 
significance of this violation, I calculated the correlation of the estimated teacher effects.  
The teacher effects from the model that included the t-1 score and t-2 inputs were 
correlated at 0.99 with the same model that excluded the t-2 inputs.  The model that 
included the t-1 and t-2 score as well as the t-2 inputs was correlated at 0.96 with the 
model that excluded the t-2 score and inputs.  The results were highly correlated, but 
there is evidence that the violation of the assumption would affect the estimates for some 
teachers.   
Ceiling Effects 
In this section, I report the results of the analyses concerning the potential of ceiling 
effects in the test instrument to bias the teacher effects for teachers with students who 
enter their classroom already at the high end of the distribution. 
Figure 6 shows the distributions of student scale scores by grade for the current year 
and prior year.  The extent of negative skewness could indicate the potential for a ceiling 
effect.  Using one year of data (2010) as an example, we find that the greatest skewness 
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in grades 5 & 8, although the magnitudes are relatively small.  There seems to be little 
evidence of censored distributions either in the current or prior year test score.   
As noted previously, comparing the gains from t-1 to t by level of score at t-1 points 
is more of a measure of regression to the mean rather than the effect of a ceiling.  By 
comparing the gains from t-1 to t by score at t-2, we can see more clearly the potential for 
a ceiling effect.  Figure 7 provides a second assessment of the potential for ceiling effects 
by using boxplots to compare the average gains in student achievement at time t with the 
gains the student made from t-2 to t-1.  The shaded box represents the interquartile range 
(75
th
 percentile is top, 25
th
 percentile is bottom) of the average scale score gains for 
students in each decile.  The vertical lines emanating from the shaded box are the upper 
and lower adjacent values, which by convention extend 1.5 times the difference in the 
75
th
 and 25
th
 quartiles.  The dots indicate values beyond the upper and lower adjacent 
values.    Students in the bottom and top deciles have some of the highest average gains 
two years later.  The variation of the gains among the deciles of prior achievement 
generally decreases as we move up the distribution of prior achievement.  Students in the 
top 10% of achievement at t-2 have the highest average gains but also the smallest 
variation in those gains. 
Figure 8 maps the relationship between the mean score at t-1 of a teachers’ students 
and the teacher’s value-added at t.  There is no evidence of a linear relationship and this 
is not surprising because the classroom means of prior achievement were included as a 
covariate in our base model.    However, the figure does show what seems to be smaller 
variation in the teacher effects when the mean prior achievement of the students is greater 
or less that one standard deviation below their peers. 
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To explore this further, Figure 9 plots the relationship of the proportion of a teacher’s 
students in the top and bottom 10% in prior year achievement to the teacher’s effect in 
year t.  I weighted each teacher by the number of students the teacher instructed during 
the period.  It is possible that teachers with high proportions of students in the top 
quantiles of prior achievement taught fewer students.  If this were the case, the smaller 
variation of the estimated effects of these teachers could be due more to the shrinkage 
estimator than the possibility of a ceiling effect.  This would be equally in the case of 
teachers with high proportions of students who are in the bottom quantiles.   
Figure 9 provides mixed signals.  On the one hand, there appear to be thresholds of 
proportions of students in the top quantiles above which teacher effects seem to move 
toward zero.  It seems to be the case that many, but not all, of the teachers above this 
threshold have fewer students and effects generally closer to the mean.  The pattern is 
similar in looking at the teacher effects of students with high proportions of students in 
the bottom 10% of the previous year, although it seems that these teachers generally have 
fewer students than their peers.  In both cases, we see less variation in the teacher effects 
at the tails of the distributions of students and it seems that at least part of this is due to 
these teachers having fewer students. 
 To probe deeper, I examined how many students scored high enough on test at t-1 
that it would be impossible for them to increase their scores by the amount of the effect 
of the highest value-added teachers.  For example, for eighth grade math in 2010, the 
highest value-added teacher added approximate 3.5 scale score points.  I counted how 
many students were within 3.5 scale score points in year t-1 of the maximum score in 
year t.  The intuition is that if a teacher had a large proportion of these students, the 
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teacher could not be the highest value-added teacher.  In the sample, across all grades and 
years, 0.32% of the students could not have raised their scores by the size of the effect of 
the highest value-added teacher.  Of these students, 15% hit the ceiling the next year.  So 
across three years and five grades, 76 of 89,300 students hit the test score ceiling before 
they could move up by the amount of scale score points added by the highest value-added 
teacher. 
 As another test of the sensitivity of the teacher effects, I re-estimated the preferred 
model with samples trimmed at the 99
th
, 95
th
, and 90
th
 percentiles of the student’s prior 
achievement.  The results are summarized in Table 10.  The standard deviation of the 
teacher effects was unchanged across all specifications and the correlations of the teacher 
effects across the models was greater than 0.99.   Trimming high-performing students did 
not exclude any classrooms or teachers from the sample.   
 The differences in the models for a district lay primarily in changes in the 
percentile ranking that are wrought from trimming the samples.  Although the mean 
difference in percentile rankings for teachers in any of the trimmed sample models from 
the untrimmed sample was zero, there was some movement.  For example, trimming the 
top 10% would result in approximately 95% of the teachers experiencing a percentile 
rank change of less than or equal to 7.8 percentile points.  Depending on how the district 
grouped its teachers, this could be more or less significant.    
As a final check on the impact of ceiling effects, I examined the impact of an 
alternative way of standardizing the student’s current year score.  Given the difference in 
gains among students in different deciles of the distribution of scores at t-1, I re-estimated 
the base model but standardized the score at time t with by the decile of the score at time 
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t-1.  Table 11 summarizes the results.   I use this alternative normalization of the current 
year score in the models in columns 2, 4, and 6.  In addition, to check the sensitivity of 
the ceiling effects to the number of students a teacher has, I re-estimate the model with 
one, two, and three years of data.  The intuition, following Koedel and Betts (2009a), is 
that additional years of data should mitigate the potential of sorting to bias teacher effects 
(in this case by reducing the teachers’ proportions of students at the tails of the 
distribution).   
Table 11 shows that the alternative normalization increases the standard deviation of 
the teacher effects by one-third, and the classroom effects by an even greater amount.  
This could be a statistical artifact of the alternative normalization or possibly an 
indication that there is greater variation in teacher effects at different points of the 
distribution of prior student scores.  Examining the correlations among the models, it 
seems that having multiple years of data for a teacher makes more of a difference for a 
teacher’s effect than the alternative normalization.  Across all teachers the effects 
generated from one-year versus three years are correlated at 0.69-0.76.  The results of the 
alternative normalization are highly correlated for all teachers, with slightly weaker 
correlations for teachers with large numbers of students who were in the top decile of 
achievement in the prior year.  Table 11 suggests that a district concerned about ceiling 
effects could mitigate any negative bias by including more years of teacher data as a way 
of smoothing out any shocks to the teachers’ classroom composition due to sorting. 
Sorting 
In this section, I report the results of the analyses outlined above concerning the 
potential of sorting of students to teachers to bias the effects of some teachers.  To begin 
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the exploration of the potential of sorting of teachers to students to bias estimates of 
teacher effects, I considered three sorting scenarios that use the student’s score at t-1 as 
the sorting criterion.  The first is that of perfect sorting in which within each school-year-
grade combination, students are sorted into classes strictly by their scores at t-1 while 
preserving the original class sizes.  The second is similar to the first except that now 
students are sorted randomly into classes.  The third scenario is the actual classroom 
assignments in the data.   
I began by calculating the standard deviations and means of the teachers’ 
students’ scores at t-1 as a measure of the sorting of students to teachers in each of the 
three scenarios.  Figure 11 shows the distribution of these means and standard deviations 
across teachers.  Actual sorting in the sample results in average classroom standard 
deviations of prior test scores that are closer to distribution of standard deviations from 
the simulated random sorting than the perfectly sorted simulation.  In Table 12, I re-
estimated the preferred model using the perfectly and randomly sorted samples.  The 
distribution of teacher effects was slightly larger in the simulated samples and this 
seemed to result from a slightly smaller variation in the classroom-level random effects. 
 Next, following Hanushek and Rivkin (2009), I created a subsample of 
classrooms that do not appear to be sorted on the student scores at t-1.  I regressed the 
student scores at t-1 on each classroom within each year, school and grade.  If the F-tests 
of joint significance of the classroom indicators failed to reject the null at p<.05, I 
considered that school-grade-year’s classrooms to be not-sorted.  This subsample 
included 15,159 student-year observations (approximately 17% of the full sample) 
containing 830 classrooms, 473 teachers, and 210 school-year-grades. 
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Then, I ran a series of regressions on these samples in which I estimated the 
effects of the teacher in time t and t+1 on student scores at time t.  As discussed above, 
the intuition is that the student’s teacher at t+1 should not have an effect on test scores 
from time t.  Table 13 reports the results.  Columns 1-2 summarize results from two 
regressions using the preferred model for the full subsample of students from 2008 and 
2009 for which we have data on classroom assignments in the following year.  Column 1 
is the preferred model using the teacher and classroom at time t as the random effects.  
Column 2 repeats the estimation but substitutes the teacher and classroom at time t for 
those at time t+1.  Columns 3-4 repeat the procedure but use the subsample of classrooms 
from Columns 1-2 that are sorted on student scores at t-1.  Columns 5-6 replicate the 
analysis on the smaller subsample of classrooms that were not sorted on student scores at 
t-1. 
In each sample, the teacher and classroom at t+1 did predict student achievement 
at t as would be expected if students sorted to classrooms in t+1 based on their scores at t.  
The variation in teacher effects at t+1 for the full and sorted samples was approximately 
80% of that of the variation of teacher effects at t.   Even in the non-sorted sample, the 
t+1 teacher effects had roughly 60% of the variation of the teacher effects at t.  This is 
surprising because this is the sample in which we could reject sorting among classrooms 
based on student scores at t-1.  This suggests that there could be sorting on other 
observables or unobservables that are biasing the teacher effects.  Finally, a puzzling 
result is the coefficients at the student test scores at time t-1 for the non-sorted subsample 
in columns 5-6.   Note that the coefficients on the score become insignificant both 
statistically and substantively.   
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In sum, the evidence for sorting bias is mixed.  On the one hand, the simulations 
of perfect and random sorting resulted in slightly wider distributions of teacher effects.  
This seemed to be related to an accompanying narrowing of the distribution of the 
classroom effects.  On the other hand, the replication of the Rothstein falsification test 
indicated that the effect of teachers at t+1 on student scores at t was significant, even in 
the non-sorted sample. 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
In this section, I turn to exploring two possible policy uses of value-added 
estimates—as a measure of equity for students and as an input into personnel decisions. 
Distributing Teachers to Students 
I began by estimating kernel densities of the distributions of the teacher effects 
across and within schools in Figure 13.  The across and within school teacher effects are 
derived from model summarized in Table 7, column 4 which is the preferred model.  The 
within school distribution teacher effects came from re-estimating the preferred model 
and adding school fixed effects.  The standard deviation of teacher effects in the base 
model was 0.15 student level standard deviations.  For the model with school fixed 
effects, the standard deviation of the teacher effects decreased by 20% to 0.12 standard 
deviations.    Figure 14 provides boxplots of the teacher effects for all schools in the 
sample over the period 2008-2010, sorted from left to right by the mean teacher effect for 
each school.  The between school variation in teacher effects is approximately 0.07 
student-level standard deviations and the within school is 0.11.  Both Figure 13 and 
Figure 14 provide evidence that there is substantially more variation in teacher 
effectiveness within schools than between them.   
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Knowing that there is substantial variation both within and between schools, a 
district will want to monitor the sorting of students to high- and low-value added teachers 
both within and across schools.  The district will need to ensure that (1) high-value added 
teachers are at every school and (2) within the schools, these teachers are distributed 
across students in a way that meets the district’s policy objectives. 
Figure 15 shows the distribution of the district’s top (Panel A) and bottom (Panel 
B) quartile value-added teachers across schools.  Each circle represents one school 
weighted by the school’s student enrollment during the period 2008-2010.  There were a 
number of schools with no teachers in the district’s top (Panel A) or bottom (Panel B) 
quartile of teachers during the period, and many of these schools had smaller student 
populations.  There seemed to be a negative relationship between the proportion of 
teachers in the top 25% of the district and the proportion of the school’s students 
qualifying for free or reduced lunch.  There was almost no relationship between the 
proportion of bottom 25% teachers and the school’s proportion of students eligible for 
free and reduced lunch status. 
Following an analysis by Aaronson, Barrow and Sander (2007), I explored whether 
some types of students benefited more from good teaching than others.  Table 14 
summarizes the results.  Each column represents a estimation of the base model for 
teacher effects restricted to the sample indicated by the column header.  For example, 
column 1 reports results from students who scored in the bottom quartile in the previous 
year.  The standard deviation of their test scores in scale score points was 6.4 and the 
mean gain in their scores from t-1 to t as 6.8.  For their group, a one standard deviation 
change in teacher effectiveness resulted in a 0.13 standard deviation increase in their test 
83 
 
scores, or 0.84 scale score points.  The proportion of the mean gain in scores by students 
in the lowest quartile from t-1 that could be attributed to the teachers was then 
0.84/6.8=.12.  So, twelve percent 12% of their gain was associated with the difference in 
a teacher at the 50
th
 percentile vs. 84
th
 percentile of the distribution of teacher 
effectiveness. 
Columns 1-4 of Table 14 show that the proportion of mean gains attributable to the 
teacher were the smallest for the students in the bottom quartile relative to the other 
quartiles.  This is largely due to the largely average gains made by the lower quartile 
students that do not yield large variation in the effect of the teachers a fact borne out in 
Figure 10.  The higher gains associated with this group could stem from some sort of 
mean reversion that is being netted out of the teacher effect.  Indeed the proportion of the 
mean gain attributable to teachers in the top quartile is 2.5 times greater than that of the 
teachers of bottom quartile students.  The results provide some evidence that in math 
students in the top 50% of performance coming into the year will benefit more from 
teaching than those in the bottom fifty percent. 
Columns 5-8 show the results by ethnicity.  I found more homogeneity across ethnic 
groups than achievement groups.  The standard deviation of teacher effects was similar 
across groups as well as the proportion of the mean gain that could be attributable to the 
teacher.  This suggests that teachers do not seem to matter more or less for different 
ethnic groups. 
Table 15 extends the analysis further by summarizing the difference in 
probabilities that certain types of students are assigned a top or bottom quartile teacher 
from the prior year or a teacher whose prior year data is unobservable.  Each column 
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reports the results from a probit estimation of the probability of being assigned a top 
(columns 1-2) or bottom (columns 3-4) quartile value-added teacher from the prior year.  
Columns 5-6 estimate the probability of being assigned a teacher whose prior year value-
added was unobservable (e.g., a novice teacher).  The results in columns 1-3-5 reflect 
across and within school differences.  Columns 2-4-6 reflect within school probabilities 
by including school fixed effects in the specifications for columns 1-3-5. 
The samples for these estimations were smaller than the sample used throughout 
this study for estimating the base model.  I used only 2009 and 2010 because I needed to 
have a value-added score from the teacher at t-1.  The sample was further reduced in 
within-schools estimations in columns 2-4-6.  Approximately 29% of the schools had no 
top quartile teachers and 39% had none in the bottom quartile, and 7% had no teachers 
who were missing a value-added score from the prior year, and as a result these schools 
were eliminated from the estimation. 
Even with the reduced sample sizes, a district could learn a great deal from this 
simple analysis. There were no differences among the groups in their probability of being 
assigned a bottom quartile teacher and only a few in terms of the probability of being 
assigned a teacher with unobservable value-added data.  There were differences in 
exposure to top quartile teachers.   For example, white students were 5% more likely to 
have a top quartile teacher from the prior year and this discrepancy persisted, although 
with a smaller magnitude, when looking within schools.  Whites were also 4.3% more 
likely to have top quartile teachers than Hispanic students but this difference eroded 
when looking within schools.     
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There are interesting differences when comparing ethnicities by quartile.  Within 
schools, white students who scored in the top quartile in the previous year were 2.7% less 
likely to be assigned a top quartile teacher than black students who scored in the top 
quartile in the previous year, but 2.3% more likely to be assigned a teacher with a known 
value-added measure from the prior year.  Conversely, within schools, white students 
from the top quartile were 2.3% more likely to be assigned a top quartile teacher than 
Hispanic students from the top quartile. 
Perhaps the starkest discrepancies came from comparisons of black students from 
the top and bottom quartiles of achievement in the prior year.  Black students from the 
top quartile were 6.8% more likely to be assigned a top quartile teacher than black 
students from the bottom quartile.  Most of the difference was coming is coming from 
assignment patterns within schools.  Similarly, black students from the top quartile were 
3.2% less likely than black students from the bottom quartile to be assigned a teacher 
with missing prior year value-added data and this difference persisted within schools. 
Personnel Decisions 
A far more controversial policy use of teacher value-added estimates is in personnel 
decisions such as retention and compensation.  In this section, I explore how useful these 
measures might be for districts. 
I began by decomposing the variation in teacher effects between and within 
teachers.  In Table 16, columns 1-2 show that the proportion of between-teacher variation 
in teacher effects was twice as large as that within teachers.  This could suggest to the 
district that selection rather than professional development may be a greater lever for 
increasing the overall effectiveness of its teaching workforce.  Following the 
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decomposition outlined previously, I found that approximately 81% of the variation in 
teacher effects was attributable to either between- or within-teacher variation (the 
remaining portion to estimation error of the teacher effects).  Fifty-one percent of the 
variation was persistent across years.  The signal in the variation of teacher effects 
seemed to dwarf that of current evaluation systems in which 98% of teachers are rated as 
satisfactory or above. 
Districts will also want to know to what extent the estimates of the teacher effects 
are stable across time.  Table 17 provides an analysis based upon the movement of a 
teacher from one quartile to another from one year to the next.  The transition tables in 
Panels A-C report the movement of teachers among quartiles from 2009 to 2010.  Panel 
A places teachers in quartiles in 2009 and 2010 based upon single-year estimation of the 
teacher effects.  Panel B places them in quartiles based upon an estimation using the 
teacher’s pooled data from multiple years (i.e., the 2009 quartile is based upon available 
teacher data from 2008-2009; the 2010 quartile is based upon available teacher data from 
2008-2010).  Panel C replicated Panel B but restricted the sample to only teachers who 
had data in all years. 
The stability of the estimates was weakest when the teacher’s placement in a 
quartile depended on one year of data.  The between year correlation was 0.48 with 8.9% 
of the teachers in the bottom quartile in 2009 moving to the top quartile in 2010 and 5.5% 
moving from the top to the bottom quartile in one year.  Approximately 52% of the 
teachers in the top quartile stayed there a year later, and 42% of those in the bottom 
quartile stayed.  The stability of the estimates increased dramatically when using more 
than one year of data in Panel B.  Just 0.4% of the teachers moved from the top to the 
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bottom quartiles or vice versa.   Approximately 82% of the teachers who were in the top 
quartile stayed there, a similar percentage as for those who remained in the bottom 
quartile.  The teacher effect point estimates were correlated at 0.94.  
Panel C provides a check to see how much of the movement among quartiles 
could be a result of a selection effect of teachers moving in and out of the sample.  The 
transition matrix from Panel B was replicated, but the quartiles were calculated using 
teachers who were present each year from 2008-2010.  The results were similar to those 
of Panel B.  Fewer teachers seemed to be moving more than one quartile and more are 
moving one quartile. 
A chief use of the teacher effect estimates for a district may be to distinguish 
between the effect of teachers for the use of high-stakes rewards or sanctions.  To that 
end, a district will need to grapple with the uncertainty around the estimates.  Figure 16 
provides a way of examining district options for the confidence intervals to categorize 
teachers into distinct groups based upon their effects.  For example, in our sample a 95% 
confidence interval around the teacher effect estimates distinguished 14% of the teachers 
as above the mean and 13% teachers below. Some would argue that given the state of 
teacher evaluation in which the vast majority of teachers are deemed effective, that we do 
not need to be 95% certain that a teacher is above the mean for us to deem the teacher 
above average.  The other panels in Figure 16 show how many teachers are distinct from 
the mean at 90%, 85%, and 80% confidence intervals.  If a district moved to an 80% 
confidence interval, then it could place 44% of its teachers below or above the mean. 
 Some argue that this way of using the confidence interval ignores important 
information about the likelihood that a given teacher effect estimate is above or below the 
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mean even if its confidence interval includes the mean.  In Figure 17, I estimate the 
probability that a teacher’s effect is above the mean on the assumption that the estimation 
error around the estimate is normally distributed.  Using this approach, the district could 
be 90% or more confident that approximately 22% of its teachers are above the mean and 
about 80% or more confident that approximately 30% of its teachers are above the mean.  
In either case, this approach allows the district to expand the number of teachers it can 
label distinct from the average.  It could also be applied to other thresholds, such as the 
probability that a teacher is in the top quartile. 
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DISCUSSION
The potential of value-added models for use in measuring teacher effectiveness 
should be evaluated in light of the current state of teacher evaluation in which nearly 98% 
of teachers nationally are rated as satisfactory or above despite large differences in their 
impact on student achievement.  Value-added measures are not perfect measures.  They 
cover only teachers who teach subjects and grades for which there are standardized tests.  
They assume that the standardized tests are telling the district something about the 
learning that happened in the classroom.  The imprecision of the estimates give pause to 
some.   
And yet these limitations should be seen in context.  Many of the other measures 
proposed such as classroom observations or student work samples are also imperfect.  A 
classroom observation that occurs maybe four times for a total of one or two hours over 
the course of 180 instructional days has confidence intervals around it as well.   They are 
subject to factors outside the control of the teacher, too, such as the subjectivity of the 
observer.  They are stable across time only because there is little variation in the results, 
period.  Each measure is going to have shortcomings.  For any proposed measure, the 
district must ask whether it adds information to what it currently knows about its 
teachers.   
Many districts have concluded that value-added measures of teacher effectiveness 
provide more information about teachers than they have presently.  The decision to 
pursue value-added measures by a district raises a number of decisions for the district.  
These decisions often have neither a wrong or right answer, but instead reflect a trade-off 
among viable policy options.  The central questions addressed in this study are  
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1. What are the benefits and costs of various value-added models in terms of the 
identification and specification of teacher effects? 
2. How serious are three often-cited threats to the validity of value-added 
estimates—influence of prior inputs, ceiling effects in the test instrument and 
the sorting of teachers to students?  What can be done to mitigate the risks 
they pose? 
3. Are value-added estimates suitable for use in (a) considerations of a district’s 
equitable allocation of its resources across students, and (b) personnel 
decisions? 
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF VARIOUS MODELS 
The results of the study may provide some comfort to districts overwhelmed by 
some of the statistical arguments within the academic community on the proper 
specification of the value-added models.  In most cases, the resulting value-added 
estimates seemed to differ very little across specifications.  In terms of modeling student 
heterogeneity, the results were largely insensitive as to whether the district includes one 
or two prior scores as predictors of the current year score.  Instrumenting for the score at 
t-1 with the score at t-2 in an effort to deal with measurement error also resulted in little 
difference in the effect estimates.  Student fixed effect and gainscore models were less 
correlated with the results from the simple lagged score models largely due to the noisier 
estimates created by these estimators. 
 Given the similarity of the results, a district is freer to choose a model that allows 
more students and teachers to be included in the estimation.  The models that required a 
second lagged score eliminate a significant portion of students who are missing that for 
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two reasons.  First, some students will be missing those prior scores because they are new 
to the district and they are likely to be lower performing on average.  Second, for 
example, in Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, the decision to require two prior lagged 
scores would eliminate all fourth-graders from the estimation (there is no second grade 
test).  Note that the student fixed effects models also restrict the number students and 
teachers included.  The identifying variation comes from students who switched teachers 
implying again that fourth grade students who are not repeating the grade with a different 
teacher will not be included in the estimation.  So the district can choose an approach that 
is both simpler to calculate (e.g., the Lag (1) model that requires only one prior test score) 
and includes more students and teachers and which will result in very similar results to 
the more complicated models. 
The district faces similar flexibility in choosing how to measure classroom and 
school heterogeneity.  The models with additional classroom- and school-level 
characteristics covariates correlated strongly with the model that included only student 
level characteristics.  As one would expect, adding school fixed effects did change the 
results significantly because the teacher effects were being identified only within schools, 
making across-school estimates impossible.  The trade-off for the district is that only the 
school fixed effects can handle the unobserved school characteristics (such the effects of 
a great principal) that could otherwise be included in the teacher’s effect estimates, giving 
some teachers an advantage over others just based on the school they served.  The general 
flexibility provided by the models allows districts to work with their stakeholders, 
primarily teachers, in deciding which classroom and school characteristics to include. 
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Similarly, the results of estimating different forms of teacher effects yielded very 
similar results.  The estimates from fixed and random teacher effects yielded almost 
identical estimates, perhaps due to the large sample sizes.  The result of the teacher 
random effects, especially when adding the classroom random effects, was a normal 
distribution that was much tighter around the mean.  The tighter distribution makes it 
more likely that the district will fail to identify teachers who are significantly above or 
below the mean of teacher effectiveness (the tails shrink toward the mean). At the same, 
time, it is likely to improve the inter-temporal stability of the estimates which could result 
in more teacher buy-in for the use of the value-added data. 
THREATS TO THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCES 
After establishing a preferred model, I tested it for its sensitivity to three potential 
threats to the validity of its estimates. 
Influence of Prior Inputs 
I did find evidence that a student’s prior score was not capturing the effect of all 
prior inputs.  This violates a central assumption of value-added models that incorporate 
lagged scores.  It was unclear, however, how this violation resulted in different teacher 
effects for a district.  Conditional on the prior score, including the prior inputs did not 
measurably change the resulting teacher effects. 
Ceiling Effects 
A common fear of teachers is that value-added measures penalize teachers whose 
students who enter the year at the upper end of the prior test distribution.  In the study, I 
conducted several tests on the potential severity of the ceiling effect to bias the teacher 
effect estimates and the results were mixed.  On the one hand, I found little evidence of 
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right-censored distributions in examining current and prior year scores.  Further, students 
in the top decile at t-2 had the highest median gain from t-1 to t but the smallest variation 
in those gains.  I found no relationship between the mean scores of a teacher’s students at 
t-1 and the teacher’s effect on those students at time t. I estimated the number of students 
who hit the ceiling in year t before they could have yielded their teacher the highest 
teacher effect that year was only 76 of 89,300 students.  And I estimated teacher effects 
trimming the sample of the students at the 99
th
, 95
th
 and 90
th
 percentile of the students’ 
scores at t-1.  The correlations between the models were extremely high, although there 
was some movement in the rankings for some teachers. 
On the other hand, a few of the tests did indicate that ceiling effects could be 
biasing the results.  Teachers with large concentrations of students from the top quartile 
or decile of the prior year score did have smaller variation in their effects.  One 
explanation is that for high performing students the tests offers less range for the for the 
students to score (i.e., they are going to be scoring high anyway so that the margin of 
effect for the teacher is much smaller, perhaps even depending on how the students 
answer very few questions).   
I also estimated a series of models that normalized the student’s score at t by the 
decile of their score at t-1.  The correlations of the effects were high for all teachers 
(0.87) and slightly lower for teachers with high concentrations of previously high (0.84) 
or low (0.81) students.  The results suggest that the district that wanted to minimize any 
potential ceiling effects might be better served by focusing on including more than one 
year of data for a teacher in the estimation.  This could reduce the teacher’s proportion of 
the number of students at the upper and lower ends of the distribution. 
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In sum, the risk of ceiling effects biasing teacher effects in this district was minimal 
and districts could address the minimal risk by including more than one year of teacher 
data in the estimations. 
Sorting of Teachers and Students 
The threat that the sorting of students to teachers could bias teacher effects has 
received considerably more attention than ceiling effects.  To test the severity of any bias 
due to sorting, I focused on sorting based on student scores at t-1.  I found that the 
variation in teacher effects was very similar (0.15-0.16 sds) over simulated conditions of 
sorting that yielded very different within-class variation in student prior test scores. 
At the same time, I did find evidence that sorting on test scores did seem to lead to the 
seeming impossibility of the teacher at t+1 having an effect on the student at t, both in 
samples sorted and not sorted on prior test scores.  This would suggest that some sort of 
sorting on unobservables that are not being captured in the student’s prior test scores is 
occurring and that the teacher results could be biased by this sorting.  To the extent that 
students were sorted based on their score at time t to their classroom at t+1, then we 
would expect that at time t+1, the teacher will look as if they had an impact on the score 
at t.  The results of this study are less reassuring than recent work would indicate (Koedel 
& Betts, 2009a).  There are limits to testing the severity of sorting bias in the 
observational data.  The real test of the threat of sorting will come from experiments 
using random assignment of teachers such as current national studies being conducted by 
the Gates foundation and Harvard’s Center for Education Policy Research.
3
 
 
                                                 
3
 See the Measuring Effective Teaching project at http://www.metproject.org/ and the 
Harvard at http://www.gse.harvard.edu/ncte/default.php. 
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Finally, I turned to two possible uses of the value-added estimates for the district. 
Distributing Teachers to Students 
I found that value-added estimates can provide districts a great deal of information 
that can inform its policies to ensure that students get access to its most effective 
teachers.  A district wanting to ensure that every student has access to its highly effective 
teachers will need to ensure both that every school has these teachers and that within 
these schools every student has access to them.  I found evidence that in CMS schools 
there was significant variation in high value-added teachers across schools and that 
schools with larger proportions of students eligible for free or reduced lunch also tended 
to have fewer high value-added teachers. 
When examining differences in the probabilities that certain types of students 
were more or less likely to be assigned highly effective teachers, I found evidence of 
differential rates of exposure.  In general whites were more likely to be assigned high 
value-added teachers than blacks both across schools and within schools.  The starkest 
difference in the exposure rates came in the significantly higher likelihood that black 
students from the top quartile of prior performance had high-value added teachers than 
black students from the lower quartile.  The majority of this difference was happening 
within schools.  Interestingly, there were no real differences in exposure to low value-
added teachers between any of the groups. 
Personnel Decisions 
Given the rather uniform distribution their teacher evaluation scores, many districts 
will consider using value-added estimates as a criterion for high-stakes personnel 
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decisions such as compensation, tenure or layoffs.  Districts may have more confidence 
in value-added measures if their results are somewhat stable over time and if the 
measures are precise enough to distinguish between teachers.  The results would seem 
encouraging to districts.  Including more than one year of data for teacher radically 
improves the stability of the estimates from year to year.  The teacher’s effect in year t is 
correlated with the effect at t+1 at 0.94 when using multiple years of data to estimate the 
effect at year t.  Prior performance on value-added is a strong predictor of future 
performance. 
The results on the precision of the estimates were not as strong.  A district must 
consider how confident it needs to be to designate a teacher as above or below average.  
A district that requires a 95% confidence interval is going to be able to pinpoint 
approximately 27% of its teachers as distinct from the mean.  Of course, the district has 
to ask whether it needs to be this sure given its current information on its teachers.  The 
results indicate that estimating the probability that a teacher is above the mean or in a 
certain quartile could allow the district to identify additional teachers. 
 The degree of imprecision in the value-added estimates will need to be viewed by 
districts in the context of the other measures it uses.  In many cases, districts lack the 
comparable reliability statistics for other measures it uses such as classroom observations.  
Does the district have reason to believe that these measures are more or less precise than 
the value-added estimates?  Can the imprecision of the value-added estimates be offset by 
including other measures or is the result of combining noisy measures just more noise? 
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FURTHER RESEARCH 
The results of this study suggest fruitful avenues of research that could be helpful 
for districts.  First, districts could benefit from further help with handling missing data on 
prior student performance.  One approach would be the creation of within-state 
longitudinal data systems so that students transferring into a district from within the state 
would have their test scores follow them.  Another approach would be technical expertise 
on how to include imputation techniques in a district’s value-added approach.  The 
vexing problem for districts is the large number of students who are missing data on prior 
achievement and seem to score systematically lower than their peers once they are in the 
district. 
A second line of research would aid districts in using value-added estimates to 
help teachers improve their instruction.  Some districts may use value-added only as a 
sorting mechanism.  Others will want to use them as diagnostically as possible on the 
assumption that moving the entire distribution of teachers will result in larger student 
achievement gains than lopping off the bottom tail of the distribution and replacing it.  
Value-added estimates in and of themselves do not provide teachers data on why their 
students are scoring higher or lower than expected with an average teacher.  One way to 
improve the estimates might be to investigate whether or not teachers’ value-added varies 
by student-type.  For example, teachers could see that they are doing well with their 
previously high-performing students but not as well with their lower-performing students.  
One could imagine any number of student subgroups for which a district could calculate a 
teacher’s value-added in hopes of providing deeper insight into the teacher’s 
effectiveness. 
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 Finally, districts could use more research such as the randomized assignment 
studies mentioned above to understand more fully to what extent the sorting of teachers 
to students could bias teacher effect estimates. 
9
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TABLE 3:  Exposure to Multiple Classes and Teachers in Math within Year. 
Math Classes in 2010 # of Different Classes 
# of Different Teachers 1 2 3 Total 
1 51.1 0.0 0.0 51.1 
2 37.5 10.8 0.2 48.4 
3 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5 
Total 88.6 11.2 0.3 100.0 
     
# of students 42552    
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2010).  Figures are cell percentages. 
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TABLE 5:  Accounting for Student Heterogeneity. 
TABLE 5 (continued)       
  
Lag (1) Lag (2) IV 
Gain-
score 
Student  
Fixed 
Effects 
First 
Difference 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Teacher Effect (SD)  
 
 
   
Unadjusted   0.20 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.34 0.24 
Adjusted 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.15 0.21 0.23 
 
      
Student-Level Error (SD)          0.47 0.43 0.47 0.51 0.39 0.41 
 
      
Student Characteristics:       
Time-Varying  204.21 188.46 1340.63 175.8 47.92 40.22 
Time-Invariant  442.79 173.69 2111.27 31.03 ~ ~ 
 
      
R
2
 0.77 0.80 0.73 0.11 0.15 0.41 
 
      
Number of Student (x) 
Year Observations 
89300 81303 81303 89300 89300 83607 
Number of Distinct 
Students 
48552 44063 44063 48552 48552 45415 
Number of Distinct 
Classrooms 
4458 4443 4443 4458 4458 4455 
Number of Distinct 
Teachers 
1144 1140 1140 1144 1144 1144 
 
      
Correlations of Teacher 
Effects Between Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lag (1) 1      
Lag (2) 0.96 1     
IV 0.99 0.96 1    
Gainscore 0.86 0.85 0.84 1   
Student Fixed Effects 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.75 1  
First Differences 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.77 0.62 1 
Notes:  CMS, Grades 5-8, (2008-2010).  All specifications include student-level 
characteristics and grade-by-year fixed effects.  Time-varying student characteristics 
include their prior year proportion of days absent of days enrolled in the prior year, 
proportion of days spent in out-of-school suspension in prior year, proportion of days 
spent in in-school suspension in prior year, whether the student is repeating the grade, 
enrolled in the school for the first time, and the number of moves between schools in the 
current year.  Time-invariant characteristics include the student's gender, limited English 
proficiency, designation as academically gifted or special education student.  In models 
that include one or more prior year math scores, the functional form of the prior scores is 
allowed to vary by up to a cubic.  Teacher effects are estimated as fixed effects and are 
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TABLE 5 (continued)       
reported in standard deviations of student test scores.  These standard deviations are 
reported in two forms--unadjusted for sampling error and adjusted as empirical Bayes 
estimates. The figures for each set of control variables are the F-statistics from a Wald 
test of the joint significance of the control variable, except in column 3 where they are 
chi-square test statistics due to the IV estimator used.  All tests reject the null of that the 
controls are jointly equal to zero at p<.001.  Models summarized in columns 1-2 and 4 
are estimated using the -felsdvreg_dm- command  (Mihaly, et al., 2010) in Stata.  Model 
in column 3 estimated using Stata's –xtivreg- command.  Model in column 6 estimated 
using the –fese- command (Nichols, 2008) in Stata. The correlations of the models use 
the teacher estimates that have been unadjusted for sampling error. 
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TABLE 6:  Accounting for Classroom and School Heterogeneity. 
TABLE 6 (continued)     
  Base 
Class 
Cov 
School 
Cov 
School 
FE 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Teacher Effect (SD)     
Unadjusted   0.20 0.19 0.20 0.33 
Adjusted 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.12 
 
    
Student-Level Error (SD)          0.47 0.46 0.46 0.46 
 
    
Student Controls                 
264.6
7 
255.3 256.02 254.62 
Classroom Controls  45.23 45.84 43.29 
School Controls   19.34  
School Fixed Effects    3.27 
 
    
R
2
 0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
 
    
Number of Student (x) Year Observations 89300    
Number of Distinct Students 48552    
Number of Distinct Classrooms 4458    
Number of Distinct Teachers 1144    
 
    
Correlations of Teacher Effects Between 
Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Base (Lag1) 1    
Classroom Covariates 0.96 1   
School Covariates 0.89 0.94 1  
School Fixed Effects 0.54 0.60 0.58 1 
      
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  All specifications include student-level 
characteristics (excluding ethnicity) described summarized in Table 4 and grade-by-year 
fixed effects. Classroom controls include the classroom means of all the student level 
characteristics as well as the class size.  School controls include the school means of all 
the student level characteristics as well as the school size, the school's mean reading 
achievement from the prior year, and the school's proportion of students who qualify for 
free or reduced price lunch.   All models include a student's prior year math score, the 
functional form of which is allowed to vary by up to a cubic.  The prior year score is 
interacted with the student's grade.  Teacher effects are estimated as fixed effects and are 
reported in standard deviations of student test scores.  These standard deviations are 
reported in two forms--unadjusted for sampling error and adjusted as empirical Bayes 
estimates. The figures for each set of control variables are the F-statistics from a Wald 
test of the joint significance of the control variable, except in column 3 where they are 
chi-square test statistics due to the IV estimator used.  All tests reject the null of that the 
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TABLE 6 (continued)     
controls are jointly equal to zero at p<.001.  Models summarized in columns 1-3 are 
estimated using the -felsdvreg_dm- command  (Mihaly, et al., 2010) in Stata.  The model 
in column 6 estimated using the –fese- command (Nichols, 2008) in Stata. The 
correlations of the models use the teacher estimates that have been unadjusted for 
sampling error. 
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TABLE 7:  Form of Teacher Effects. 
  Fixed 
 
Random 
 
Unadj Adj 
  
Class RE 
                                 (1) (2)   (3) (4) 
     
 
Teacher Effect (SD)  0.20 0.17  0.16 0.15 
                                      
Classroom Effect (SD) n/a n/a  n/a 0.10 
 
     
Student-Level Error(SD)          0.46 0.46  0.47 0.46 
 
     
R
2
 0.77 0.77  0.77 0.78 
 
     
Chi-Squared Statistic from LR test     921.85*** 
 
     
Number of Student (x) Year Observations 89300     
Number of Distinct Students 48552     
Number of Distinct Classrooms 4458     
Number of Distinct Teachers 1144     
 
     
Correlations of Teacher Effects Between Models (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
Teacher Fixed Effects (Unadjusted) 1     
Teacher Fixed Effects (Shrunken) 0.99 1    
Teacher Random Effects 0.94 0.96  1  
Teacher + Class Random Effects 0.91 0.93  0.99 1 
       
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8, (2008-2010).  All specifications include student, classroom and 
school characteristics (excluding ethnicity) summarized in Table 4 and grade-by-year 
fixed effects. All models include a student's prior year math score, the functional form of 
which is allowed to vary by up to a cubic.  The prior year score is interacted with the 
student's grade.  Teacher effects in model summarized in columns 1-2 are estimated as 
fixed effects.  The teacher effects in columns 3-4 are predictions of the teacher random 
effects using Stata's –xtmixed- command.  The model in columns 1-2 is replicated from 
Table 6, column 3.  ***p<.001 
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TABLE 8:  Effect of Race Controls. 
  Race Controls 
  Base Student Class School 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Teacher Effect (SD) Adjusted 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
     
Classroom-Level Effect (SD) 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
     
Student-Level Error (SD)          0.46 0.46 0.46 0.46 
     
Controls for Racial Composition     
Student                  
 664.65**
* 
672.41**
* 
652.58*** 
Classroom    18.81 13.82 
School     29.08*** 
 
    
Likelihood Ratio Test 
 603.69**
* 
18.77 28.86*** 
 
    
Number of Student (x) Year 
Observations 
89300    
Number of Distinct Students 48552    
Number of Distinct Classrooms 4458    
Number of Distinct Teachers 1144    
 
    
Correlations of Teacher Effects Between 
Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Base 1    
Student 0.998 1   
Classroom 0.995 0.999 1  
School 0.988 0.992 0.994 1 
          
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Each column describes maximum likelihood 
estimates of the distribution of teacher effects under different covariate specifications.  
Column 1 replicates the preferred model summarized in Table 7, column 4.  Race 
covariates are indicators for student’s self-reported ethnicity.  The figures in columns 2-4 
for each type of covariate (student, classroom, school) are the chi-square statistics for the 
joint significance of those controls.  The likelihood ratio test row reports the chi-square 
statistics for the likelihood ratio test of the model versus the model in the prior column.   
***p<.001 
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TABLE 9: Testing Assumption of Prior Year Score. 
  
Base Lag (1) Lag (2) 
                                 (1) (2) (3) 
   
 
Teacher Effect (SD) Adjusted 0.14 0.14 0.14 
 
   
Student-Level Error (SD)          0.45 0.45 0.42 
 
   
Chi-Square Statistics from t-1    
Student Characteristics 137.92*** 83.95*** 112.60*** 
Classroom Characteristics  29.38*** 339.9*** 65.51*** 
School Characteristics 29.30*** 74.78*** 69.31*** 
 
   
Chi-Square Statistics from t-2    
Student Characteristics  47.22*** 24.07** 
Classroom Characteristics   40.39*** 42.06*** 
School Characteristics  13.84* 35.21*** 
 
   
Likelihood Ratio Test  158.51*** 4459.77*** 
 
   
 
   
Number of Student (x) Year Observations 34507 34813 34507 
Number of Distinct Students 24946 25165 24946 
Number of Distinct Classrooms 2407 2409 2407 
Number of Distinct Teachers 626 627 626 
 
   
Correlations of Teacher Effects Between Models (1) (2) (3) 
Base 1   
Lag (1) 0.99 1  
Lag (2) 0.96 0.97 1 
    
Notes:  CMS, Math, Grades 5-8, (2008-2010).  All specifications include the student, 
classroom and school characteristics from the preferred model summarized in Table 7, 
column 4.  Column 1 is the preferred model.  Column 2 replicates the base and adds all 
lagged student, class and school inputs from the prior two years.  Column 3 replicates 
column 2 and adds the student's prior score from t-2.  
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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TABLE 10:  Teacher Effects with Varying Right-Censored Student Distributions. 
  Base <99 <95 <90 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Teacher Effect (SD) Adjusted 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
     
Percentile Rank Change from Base Model 
    
Mean 
 
0 0 0 
Standard Deviation 
 
2.00 2.51 3.88 
Minimum  
 
-11 -11 -45 
Maximum 
 
17 16 20 
     
Number of Student (x) Year Observations 89300 87179 84583 80909 
Number of Distinct Students 48552 48033 47076 45387 
Number of Distinct Classrooms 4458 4457 4457 4457 
Number of Distinct Teachers 1144 1144 1144 1144 
     
Correlations of Teacher Effects Between Models (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Base 1 
   
<99 0.99 1 
  
<95 1.00 1.00 1 
 
<90 1.00 1.00 1.00 1 
          
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Column 1 replicates the preferred model 
summarized in Table 7, column 4.  Columns 2-4 estimate the same model but with 
samples trimmed at the top tail of the student test score distribution at t-1.  The percentile 
rank changes refer to the differences in teacher percentile ranks under the different 
specifications. 
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TABLE 11:  Ceiling Effects. 
  Years Contributing to Teacher Effect 
 
2008  2008-09  2008-10 
                                 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
  
 
  
 
 
  
Teacher Effect (SD)       0.15 0.21  0.15 0.20  0.15 0.20 
                                  
 
  
 
 
  
Classroom Effect (SD) 0.07 0.11  0.09 0.18  0.10 0.17 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Student-Level Error (SD)          0.45 0.56  0.45 0.58  0.45 0.56 
 
 
 
  
 
 
  
Student Current Score 
Standardized by:   
 
  
 
  
All Students t-1 Scores x 
 
 x 
 
 x 
 
Decile of t-1 Scores   x   x  
 
x 
   
 
  
 
  
Number of Student (x) Year 
Observations 
19961 
19957 
 38936 
38931 
 
56687 56682 
Number of Distinct Students 19961 19957  30601 30605  39037 39041 
Number of Distinct Classrooms 940 940  1868 1868  2766 2766 
Number of Distinct Teachers 484 484  484 484  484 484 
 
  
 
  
 
  
Correlations of Teacher Effects Between 
Models  
 
  
 
  
   
 
  
 
  
All Teachers (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
(1) 1 
 
 
  
 
  
(2) 0.85 1  
  
 
  
(3) 0.83 0.70  1 
 
 
  
(4) 0.70 0.77  0.85 1  
  
(5) 0.76 0.64  0.93 0.80  1 
 
(6) 0.65 0.71  0.80 0.92  0.87 1 
   
 
  
 
  
Teachers in Top Decile of Prior 
Student  
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
(1) 1 
 
 
  
 
  
(2) 0.76 1  
  
 
  
(3) 0.81 0.60  1 
 
 
  
(4) 0.70 0.84  0.77 1  
  
(5) 0.69 0.58  0.90 0.79  1 
 
(6) 0.62 0.79  0.67 0.93  0.83 1 
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Teachers in Bottom Decile of Prior 
Student  
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) 
(1) 1 
 
 
  
 
  
(2) 0.88 1  
  
 
  
(3) 0.83 0.72  1 
 
 
  
(4) 0.69 0.87  0.74 1  
  
(5) 0.69 0.65  0.89 0.74  1 
 
(6) 0.60 0.74  0.68 0.90  0.81 1 
   
 
  
 
  Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  All models use the preferred model’s estimator 
summarized in Table 7, column 4.  Columns 1-2 restrict the sample to one year (2008); 
columns 3-4 restrict sample to two years (2008-2009); and columns 5-6 use the full three-
year sample (2008-2010).  Columns 2-4-6 normalize the student test scores at t using the 
mean and standard deviation of the decile of the students’ scores at t-1.  In the correlation 
tables, “Teachers in Top Decile of Prior Student Achievement” refers to teachers whose 
mean student test scores at t-1 was in the top decile of all teachers in the given year. 
 
  
TABLE 11 (continued) 
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TABLE 12:  Teacher Effects under Sorting. 
 Sorting 
  Actual Perfect Random 
                                 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Teacher Effect (SD) Adjusted 0.147 0.158 0.161 
 
(0.00442) (0.00425) (0.00423) 
    
Classroom Effect (SD) 0.101 0.0952 0.0759 
 (0.00260) (0.00297) (0.00360) 
    
Student Level Error (SD) 0.456 0.456 0.459 
 (0.00111) (0.00118) (0.00120) 
    
SD of Student Scores (t-1) by Class 0.61 0.16 0.82 
 
   
Number of Student (x) Year 
Observations 
89300   
Number of Distinct Students 48552   
Number of Distinct Classrooms 4458   
Number of Distinct Teachers 1144   
    
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  All models use the preferred model’s estimator 
summarized in Table 7, column 4.   Column 1 replicates the preferred model which is 
estimated under the actual degree of sorting of students to teachers.  Column 2 simulates 
perfect sorting of students to teachers within year, school, and grade by prior test score.  
Column 3 simulates random assignment of student to teachers within year, school and 
grade.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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TABLE 13:  Testing for Effects of Next Year’s Teacher on Current Year Gains. 
  Full  Sorted Not Sorted 
 
t t+1 t t+1 t t+1 
                                 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Teacher Effect (SD)  0.15 0.12 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.08 
 
      Classroom Effect (SD)  0.09 0.24 0.08 0.22 0.10 0.25 
 
      Student Level Error (SD)  0.46 0.44 0.45 0.44 0.46 0.44 
       
Math Score at t-1 0.532*** 0.461*** 0.554*** 0.498*** 0.046 -0.028 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.23) (0.25) 
       
Math Score at t-1 Squared 0.005 -0.010*** 0.002 -0.004 0.006 
-
0.022**
* 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
       
Math Score at t-1 Cubed 
-
0.0389*** 
-0.033*** 
-
0.039*** 
-
0.032*** 
-
0.038**
* 
-
0.033**
* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
       
Number of Student (x) 
Year Observations 40707 40707 32042 32042 8665 8665 
Number of Distinct 
Students 
28845 28845 24731 24731 
8641 8641 
Number of Distinct 
Classrooms 
2538 2365 1998 2274 540 940 
Number of Distinct 
Teachers 
1011 592 724 546 
391 304 
              
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-7 (2008-2009).  All models use the preferred model’s estimator 
summarized in Table 7, column 4.   Columns 1-2 use the subsample of students from the 
sample used throughout the study that have classroom assignments at t+1.  Columns 3-4 
use a subsample of the group in columns 1-2 who are in classrooms at t that are sorted on 
student test scores at t-1.  Columns 5-6 are a subsample of the group in columns 1-2 who 
are in classrooms at time t that are not sorted on the scores at t-1.  Columns 1, 3, and 5 
report the effects of teachers and classrooms at time t on student scores at time t.  Columns 
2, 4, and 6 report the effects of teachers and classrooms at time t+1 on student scores at 
time t.   Standard errors in parentheses.  ***p<.001 
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TABLE 16:  Decomposition of Teacher Effects. 
Teacher Variation (Proportion)  
Between Within Reliability Stability 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
.63 .37 .81 .51 
    
Notes:  CMS Math Grades 5-8, (2008-2010).  Based upon estimation of an alternative 
specification of the base model.  Under this random effects specification, teacher-by-year 
effects, rather than classroom random effects, are nested within teacher effects. Columns 
1-2 decompose the variation in teacher effects (net of estimation error) due to between 
and within teacher differences.  Column 3 indicates the proportion of the variation in 
teacher effects due to the between and within teacher variation.  Column 4 indicates the 
proportion of the between teacher variation of the total teacher variation.   
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TABLE 17:  Teacher Effect Transition Matrices. 
Panel A:  2009 v. 2010 
   
          Quartile in 2010 
                                   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q
u
ar
ti
le
 i
n
 
2
0
0
9
 (1) 41.8 28.8 20.5 8.9 
(2) 28.9 26.3 21.7 23.0 
(3) 20.8 22.7 31.2 25.3 
(4) 5.5 14.5 28.5 51.5 
 N=617 
Correlation of Teacher Effect Point Estimates= 0.48 
      Panel B:  <=2009 v. <=2010 
       Quartile in 2010 
                                   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q
u
ar
ti
le
 i
n
 
2
0
0
9
 (1) 83.7 14.0 1.9 0.4 
(2) 13.3 68.9 14.8 3.0 
(3) 1.1 16.7 67.4 14.8 
(4) 0.4 0.8 17.1 81.7 
 
    
N=1055 
Correlation of Teacher Effect Point Estimates= 0.94 
      
Panel C:  <=2009 vs. <=2010 for all teachers in sample all three years 
    Quartile in 2010 
                                   (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q
u
ar
ti
le
 i
n
 
2
0
0
9
 (1) 78.7 19.7 1.6 0.0 
(2) 19.0 62.7 17.5 0.8 
(3) 2.4 15.7 63.0 18.9 
(4) 0.0 0.8 18.3 81.0 
 N=506 
Correlation of Teacher Effect Point Estimates=  0.94 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8, 2008-2010.  Each panel provides a transition matrix for the 
teachers in a given quartile in 2009 who are in a given quartile in 2010.  All figures are 
row percentages.  Panel A uses quartiles based upon single year estimates of teacher 
effects in 2009 and 2010.  Panel B uses multi-year estimates of teacher effects up to and 
including 2009 and then up to and including 2010.  Panel C replicates Panel B but 
restricts the sample to those teachers who were present each year 2008-2010.  Teacher 
effects are calculated using the base model described in Table 7, column 4. 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1:  Kernel Density of Current Test Score by Prior Year Score Missingness. 
 
Notes: CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Current year test scores normalized by grade and 
year to have mean of zero and unit variation. 
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FIGURE 2:  Functional Form of Prior Score. 
 
Panel A:  Score at t and t-1 
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FIGURE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B:  Score at t and t-2 
 
 
Notes: CMS Grades 5-8 (2010).  Test scores normalized by grade and year to have mean 
of zero and unit variation. 
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FIGURE 3:  Teacher Effects and Shrinkage. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).    The distributions of the teacher effects come 
from the models estimated in Table 7. 
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FIGURE 4:  Sampling Error and Teacher Effects. 
 
Panel A:  Unshrunken Estimates 
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FIGURE 4 (continued) 
Panel B:  Shrunken Estimates 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  The effects plotted in Panels A-B come from the 
model summarized in Table 7 columns 1-2, respectively. 
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FIGURE 5: Precision of Estimates by Number of Observations. 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  The standard errors are from the teacher effects 
generated by the model summarized in Table 7, column 4. 
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FIGURE 6:  Skewness of Current and Prior Year Scores. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2010). 
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FIGURE 7:  Average Test Score Gains by Prior Test Scores. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  The elements of the figure are boxplots of the 
range of test scores changes from t-1 to t by decile of student test scores at t-2.  (Decile 
10 is top.) The shaded portion of the box represents the interquartile range.  The whiskers 
represent the range of adjacent values, and the dots represent students outside the range 
of adjacent values. 
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FIGURE 8:  Relationship of Prior Score to Current Year Teacher Effect. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Teacher effects are generated by the preferred 
model summarized in Table 7, column 4. 
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FIGURE 9:  Teacher Effects and the Proportion of Students Top and Bottom Deciles.  
 
Panel A:  Top 10% of Students 
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FIGURE 9 (continued) 
Panel B: Bottom 10% Students 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).   Teacher effects are based on preferred model 
summarized in Table 7, column 4.  
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FIGURE 10: Variation of Teacher Effects Across Student Deciles. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).   Teacher effects are based on preferred model 
summarized in Table 7, column 4.  The elements of the figure are boxplots of the range 
of teacher effects by decile of teacher mean student test scores at t-2.  (Decile 10 is top.) 
The shaded portion of the box represents the interquartile range.  The whiskers represent 
the range of adjacent values, and the dots represent students outside the range of adjacent 
values. 
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FIGURE 11:  Classroom Sorting. 
 
Panel A.  Standard Deviation of Student Scores at t-1 by Class 
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FIGURE 11 (continued) 
Panel B.  Classroom Means of Student Test Scores at t-1 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Panels A-B depict the kernel densities of 
classroom prior test score standard deviation and means under three conditions of sorting.  
The perfectly sorted sample is a simulation in which students are sorted within year, 
school, and grade by prior test score.  The randomly sorted sample simulates random 
assignment of teachers to students within these same strata.  The actual sample reflects 
the extant sorting in the data. 
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FIGURE 12:  Sorting by Subsample. 
 
Panel A:  Teacher’s SD Student Test Scores at t-1 
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FIGURE 12 (continued) 
Panel B:  Teacher’s Mean Student Test Scores at t-1 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Panels A-B depict the kernel densities of the 
standard deviations and means of the teachers’ students test scores at t-1.  The non-sorted 
and sorted samples refer to the sample described in Table 12, columns 3-4 and 5-6, 
respectively. 
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FIGURE 13: Distribution of Teacher Effects Across and Within Schools. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).    The teacher effects plotted in the density curve 
for across and within school are derived from the preferred model summarized in Table 
7, column 4.  The teacher effects for the within-school distribution are derived from an 
estimation of the preferred model that includes school fixed effects. 
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FIGURE 14:  Between and Within-School Variation in Teacher Effects. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).   Teacher effects derived from the preferred model 
preferred model summarized in Table 7, column 4.   The between and within school 
variation is calculated using Stata's -xtsum- command.  Each vertical line is a boxplot of 
the teacher effects for one school over the period 2008-2010). 
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FIGURE 15: Distribution of High and Low Value-Added Teachers Across Schools. 
 
Panel A:  Distribution of Top 25% Teachers Across Schools. 
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FIGURE 15 (continued) 
Panel B:  Distribution of Bottom 25% Teachers Across Schools. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  Panels A-B plot the proportion of a school’s 
teachers in the top and bottom quartile of teacher effects by the school’s percentage of 
students qualifying for free and reduced lunch in 2010.  The teacher effects are derived 
from the preferred model. 
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FIGURE 16:  Teacher Effects under Varying Confidence Intervals. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  The teacher effects are derived from the preferred 
model. 
 
 
  
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
T
ea
ch
er
 E
ff
ec
ts
Teachers
162 Teachers (14%) have effects above average at 95% CI (green)
150 Teachers (13% ) have effects below average at 95% CI (red)
95%
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
T
ea
ch
er
 E
ff
ec
ts
Teachers
199 Teachers (17%) have effects above average at 90% CI (green)
191 Teachers (17% ) have effects below average at 90% CI (red)
90%
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
T
ea
ch
er
 E
ff
ec
ts
Teachers
229 Teachers (20%) have effects above average at 85% CI (green)
218 Teachers (19% ) have effects below average at 85% CI (red)
85%
-.6
-.4
-.2
0
.2
.4
.6
T
ea
ch
er
 E
ff
ec
ts
Teachers
255 Teachers (22%) have effects above average at 80% CI (green)
251 Teachers (22% ) have effects below average at 80% CI (red)
80%
Teacher Effects Under Varying Confidence Intervals
149 
 
FIGURE 17:  Probabilities of Teachers in Given Quantile. 
 
 
Notes:  CMS Grades 5-8 (2008-2010).  The teacher effects are derived from the preferred 
model.  The probabilities are calculated under the assumption that the error around the 
teacher effect estimate is normally distributed.  A kernel density curve is superimposed 
on the histogram. 
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